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EDITORIAL

THE ADVENTURE OF PATIENCE

Reviewers of Mr. Sheppard's book, *The Impatience of a Parson*,* have for the most part thought fit to quote some of the more purple patches of his criticism, and take them as the text of their discourse; but the book has by this time penetrated so far that we think it may be taken as read, and proceed to consider one or two of its presuppositions and claims. Both are certainly bold; but are they true? Is it true, for example, that the world today is hungering for access to Christ, and only debarred by the stupidity or selfishness of Christ's Church? It is the kind of thing that the public, which loves flattery, likes to be told; but we believe it to be without foundation. On the contrary, we doubt whether at any time in recent ages there has been a more complacent secularism abroad. There are large sections of society which are perfectly contented with their hunting, betting, and other amusements, and desire nothing more than to be left alone to enjoy them. Some of them are probably reading Mr. Sheppard's book, because they know of his popularity; but we doubt whether any of them will do more than say what a pity it is about the parsons. At bottom, we believe that Augustine was nearer the truth than Mr. Sheppard—nearer it in the sense that he was, like St. Paul, and indeed like our Lord, wrestling with the fact that "many are called but few chosen," and "strait is the gate and narrow is the way which leadeth unto life, and few there be that find it." The Church's task is first of all to awaken the dead, and only then, when they are awakened, can it give them to eat.

Again, Mr. Sheppard seems to us to adopt far too facile an attitude towards such religious sentiment as does exist. What he pleads for in effect is that the Church of England should dispense with all its principles, whether credal or disciplinary, which appear exclusive to any people of goodwill, and should

* Hodder and Stoughton, 3s. 6d. net.

become a frankly undenominational institution. It is a minor point, perhaps, that the course he advocates could only produce another schism, or even several more: his optimism would not quail before that. A more serious criticism would seem to lie in the fact that such a policy would belie the nature of Christianity itself. Half the genius of the Christian Scriptures lies in their magnificent criticism of religion; and it was the obstinate continuance of the Church of the early centuries in this course that brought so many Christians to martyrdom. The purpose of Catholic institutions is not only to publish the truth of the Gospel, but also to preserve Christians from counterfeit religion. And amongst such counterfeits—false Christs and false prophets, as the Bible calls them—none are more dangerous today than the lower forms of Protestantism. In this country they are more or less restrained: but in America they flourish like a bay-tree, and few competent judges would admit that they represented in any sense the religion of Jesus Christ.

We will not pursue Mr. Sheppard into his outline of resolutions for the next Lambeth Conference—many of them in substance resolved in 1920—nor into his queer ideas of a new kind of Archbishop; they are not so interesting as the pictures of a *papa angelicus* which came from Fogazzaro and Heiler. Instead, we would suggest to him an experiment: to go for a period of not less than five years, in disguise and under another name, to some quiet parish of 1,000 souls or so, and observe. We would ask him to learn what he can of the lives and the family history of its inhabitants, and of the influences—economic, educational and personal—which have played upon those lives during the last generation, and, in particular, of the part played among these by the Church as an institution. We venture the belief that he would then be impressed by some facts which would greatly modify his attitude; on the one side, the extraordinary stubbornness of human nature, the longevity of its feuds, the depth and tenacity of its prejudices and mental habits; and on the other side, the quiet and glorious heroism of continuance in well-doing which is the distinguishing mark of so many characters. And if he would prove still further the secret of this heroism, we believe that in almost every case he would find that it ran up at some time or other—either in memory or in active and joyful fellowship today—to the parish church. These lives are limited, no doubt; their vision narrow; their relationships circumscribed. But they are marked by one great type of adventure which Mr. Sheppard has not included in the "values" which he covets for the Church. It is the adventure of patience.

REASON AND CHRISTIAN EXPERIENCE

III.—Reason and the Christian Revelation

We will begin this article by shortly restating in a somewhat different form the gist of our previous argument.

It is commonly assumed by our philosophical apologists that philosophical argument and religious experience constitute two quite distinct but converging lines of approach whereby the human mind arrives at its faith in God. Argument and experience support and verify one another, just because their starting-points and methods of procedure are so radically distinct that they only meet in their conclusions. By philosophical argument a man infers from the nature of the world with a greater or less degree of certainty that God must be the ultimate cause and ground of the world-order, and that His nature must be such and such; and he may then test and verify his inferences by the experience, his own and that of others, wherein the human soul appears to have entered into direct relations with God Himself. Or, on the other hand, a man may make his first approach to God through some particular system of religious practice in which he seems to apprehend the very reality of communion with the Divine; and he may then test and verify the truth of his apprehension by submitting it to the criticism of philosophical argument. Thus religious apologetic is made to rest on two independent supports, general reason and a particular experience. This twofold appeal of religion has been most ably expounded in rather different ways by the Bishop of Manchester and Professor A. E. Taylor.*

But there is a difficulty in this twofold method of apologetic. It is very apt to make it appear that the difference between the approach of reason and the approach of experience is essentially this, that the former travels by the circuitous route of inference, whereas the latter goes straight to the goal by direct apprehension. Yet reflexion shows that in regard to the knowledge of God this distinction between direct and indirect is scarcely tenable. We touch here on a point of great importance which is worth a little discussion.

It is evident that, if we consider mental acts of apprehension as they are in themselves, the act of reason, whereby I perceive that the angles at the base of an isosceles triangle are equal, is as single and immediate as any act of vision whatsoever. When my mind has gone through the steps of the proof, the act by which I grasp its cogency is one and comprehensive. Unless

* See *Christus Veritas* and *Essays Critical and Catholic.*

I *see* the cogency of the proof in a single act, the following of its steps has been useless.* If, then, I infer the reality of God from natural phenomena, the mental act in which I grasp the truth of my reasoning is as single and, so far, as immediate as the act whereby a soul in prayer realizes the divine presence.

Hence, if the religious experience is superior in point of directness, we must mean that God is more directly present to the religious consciousness than he is to the mind of the philosopher as he reasons about God. But is such an assertion really intelligible, when once we have admitted that both the religious consciousness and the philosophical reason are apprehending truth? It is easy enough for me to distinguish between the direct knowledge which I have of a friend when I am conversing with him, and the indirect knowledge which I may have about him when he is abroad. But here the possibility of the distinction depends upon the fact that my friend is spatially limited. God surely must be wherever He is truly known. And if we rightly insist that He may, by a special act of self-revelation, illuminate the mystic's vision, is it impossible that by a special act he should also illuminate the rather different processes of the philosophical mind? On the other hand, it is evident that the most mystical knowledge of divine realities is mediated to some extent by knowledge of God which the mystic has learned from others, from the theological ideas and doctrines of the society in which he lives. Certainly no religious apprehension of God which is capable of description is so wholly the direct work of God as not to be expressed through the content already within the apprehending mind.

On the whole, then, it would seem that the commonly accepted notion that the religious consciousness differs from the philosophical reason in giving a direct knowledge of God will hardly bear careful examination. And this conclusion in itself may make us wonder whether it is really possible to keep reason and religious experience apart as two independent ways of knowing God.

The attempt of our first two lectures has been to bring them together, not so as to destroy the distinction between them, but so as to show that each really needs the other in order to reach its own end. If the work of reason is the discerning of a universal order, and if that order is found to depend upon God, reason can only reach that conclusion by attaching a very high value to the religious experience among all the multitude of facts which it is its task to co-ordinate. And, on the other hand, if the religious consciousness really apprehends the one true God, it can only validate its claim to that knowledge by show-

* See L. Hodgson, *The Place of Reason in Christian Apologetic*, p. 3 sq.

ing how that which it claims to know of God throws light upon the meaning and value of all aspects of experience. If, then, reason and experience do in this manner complement each other, we are enabled to attach a special value to religious experience, without either divorcing it from reason or claiming for it a unique immediacy of apprehension which cannot rationally be maintained. The special value of the religious experience must be found rather in the fact that in it, as nowhere else, the principle of the universal order is immanent. Its truth is witnessed, not by the darkness, but by the illuminative power of its mystery. The religious experience is not like a shuttered chamber in the house of the world, whither the soul must retire to enjoy the heavenly light. Rather it resembles a torch, which, though it may best be kindled in a sheltered spot, must thereafter be used to explore the whole premises, and to show everywhere the plan of their design. But all such metaphors are inadequate and may be misleading. The main point to be made is this, that the value of the religious experience really consists in that which relates it to other experiences rather than in that which separates it from them; and it is unique in value precisely because it holds in itself the fundamental meaning of all. A man does not know what love of his neighbour really means unless he has learned a little of the love of God. He does not really appreciate beauty until he has learned to see in it an expression of the God whom he approaches in prayer. Even mathematics and physical science are bereft of the deepest significance of their truth, unless the severity of the intellectual discipline which they demand can find its place in the training of the human spirit for a divine communion. The religious experience which is both rationally and mystically the truest is that which humbles our spirits everywhere before the universal mysteriousness of the real. All human powers of cognition lead in the end to the contemplative wonder which is called forth, never by the simply non-rational, but always through the apprehension of an order which our reason divines to be too transcendently rational for our understanding. Yet that wonder lives only in the continual expenditure of the effort to understand. And it is the religious experience at its best, which, in giving glimpses of an order of goodness all-embracing, does not render the effort of the understanding futile, but enables it to glory in its own defeat.

Yet how can all this be true? How can the apparently extravagant claim which we are making for the religious experience at its best be really justified? Let us be quite clear as to what we mean by the term. We may be content to make our definition of religious experience formally as wide as possible,

so long as we remember that here we are thinking of it as one department among others of human experience, and are neglecting that different meaning of the term in which it is applied to the whole experience of the religious man. We shall not, therefore, confine the term religious experience to the soul's inward apprehensions of God in which the element of external mediation in the divine self-disclosure seems to be reduced to a minimum. We shall also include under it all those facts and interpretations of fact—that is, dogmas or beliefs—which have been marked out by the religions of the world as constituting or expressing special self-revelations of God to man. In other words, to us religious experience, as we are now using the term, denotes all those particular facts, beliefs, or perceptions which claim to give us knowledge of God in themselves, *before* they are related to man's general knowledge of the world through the process of reasoning.

Now, if we are to vindicate for religious experience the place which we seek to assign to it in the interpretation of the universe, we have to show that certain of those facts, beliefs or perceptions which we call religious do actually, when they are related by metaphysical reason to man's general knowledge of the world, throw a unique and characteristic light upon the whole, which enables the human mind dimly, but with increasing conviction, to trace a universal order of goodness present and fulfilling itself through all things. It is our further claim that such religious facts and beliefs are found in the life, death and resurrection of Jesus Christ, viewed as the self-revealing Incarnation and saving Atonement wrought by God in history, and that Christian apologetic is using its strongest weapon, not when it strives to shield these facts and beliefs from the assaults of criticism, but rather when by their means it seeks to show how in all things the plan of an eternal purpose of love is active and expressed.

We have little space left to indicate how this may be done. Nevertheless, some hint must be given of the line of thought which we have in mind.

The central problem of all modern metaphysics is to relate the order of existence to the order of goodness. In his recent book *Christus Veritas* the Bishop of Manchester has given us a most valuable statement of the philosophical grounds for asserting that there is an essential and positive connexion between the two orders. He revives an argument which in principle is as old as Plato, in pointing out that to show the good of a thing is the only way of providing for it an explanation in which the mind can ultimately rest. To see the good of a thing, and that alone, is to see it ultimately explained. That

gives the only satisfactory answer to the question, why does the thing exist? Again, the explanation which we give of a thing is closely bound up with our idea of its nature or substance. The existence of a fire in my room is explained by its value in giving me warmth. And the warmth, which is the value of the fire, is certainly not separable from its essential nature as fire. So it is with everything which we explain in terms of value, from the humblest tool which is fashioned for our use up to the greatest works of art or of nature, in so far as such "teleological" explanation is validly applied to nature at all. Following out this line of thought, the Bishop proposes, with certain qualifications, to identify the substance of a thing with its value. St. Thomas Aquinas laid it down that everything which is is good in so far as it exists. The Bishop proposes to invert this dictum by saying that everything has substantive existence in so far as it is good.

The Bishop gives a fresh turn to this doctrine of the identity of substance and value by linking it with a conception of reality as existing in many grades, which owes much to modern doctrines of evolution. The main grades of reality are matter, life, mind, and spirit. Each finds its own completion or perfect development only in so far as it is possessed or indwelt by that which is above it. But, on the other hand, each depends for its actuality upon those which are below it. Matter as experienced by us can be reduced to what is simpler than itself. Life is unknown apart from living organisms, which are matter informed by life. Mind is unknown except in living, reasoning organisms. Spirit is unknown except in conscientious, living, reasoning organisms. But still it is only as possessed or indwelt by what is spiritual that matter can reach its own full substance or reality. Thus the whole process of evolution is explained by its own highest term, which constitutes the ultimate reality or substance of the whole. This ultimate or highest reality must in the end be conceived as the source as well as the goal of all things, and is to be identified with the perfect will of the living God.

Thus, if we leave out of consideration for the moment the problem of evil, the order of real existence is made to appear as an order ultimately determined, constituted and made rational by the perfect goodness which fulfils itself through creation.

Yet, on the other hand, there is an opposite set of considerations, of which it may seem that the Bishop of Manchester has not quite appreciated the force. It is all very well to argue that the explanation and ultimate substance of all things is in their value. But it remains equally true that our concept of the

ideal derives its meaning from contrast with existence. Our idea of what is absolutely good, and our idea of what actually *is* in the world of fact, are originally formed in mutual antithesis and defined by their mutual opposition. The ground of the contrast between value and existence lies at the very root of our conscious being. For it seems probable that consciousness itself has its origin in a certain friction between the living organism and its environment. It is the impeding of vital functions which first makes the organism aware of existing objects other than itself, and so brings consciousness and then self-consciousness into play as natural instruments whereby life maintains itself and exerts control in the midst of a partially hostile and unresponsive world. If so, from the very beginning our concept of existence is founded upon an experience of resistance. And certainly it is true that our awareness of facts as such, and even of ourselves as existing facts over against others, is at its clearest and sharpest when our conations are impeded, or, to use simpler language, when we find it hard to get what we want.

When we have what we want and are enjoying it, our consciousness of what exactly it is tends to be lost in our experience of its goodness. It is when what we have does not satisfy that we ask questions and learn about facts. The same law applies in the most trivial and the most exalted instances. The natural man, if his dinner is good, does not enquire closely into its composition, unless he is afraid that, if he omits to do so, the repetition of such an experience is unlikely. It is the tough joint that leads to more intimate knowledge of the nature and proper treatment of frozen mutton. Equally in the highest raptures of æsthetic appreciation we do not stop to ask how, or of what, that which we contemplate has been constructed. Broadly speaking, we learn about our world because it does not satisfy our desires.

And all the greatest philosophies and religions have united to show us that our desires at their highest and deepest never could be satisfied by what we call our world. In fact, the highest works of beauty and the greatest acts of moral heroism depend in part upon failure for their very goodness. They always manifest the ideal through a medium of existence which remains in some degree recalcitrant. The most beautiful of man's æsthetic creations are never quite successful. They suggest infinitely more than they can compass in expression. Even the contemplation of nature at her loveliest gives an intensity of pleasure which is not far removed from an almost intolerable pain. Moral success, as distinct from æsthetic, depends upon the result of action; for every moral act has a

definite end in view, the bringing to pass of some better state of things. Yet the world recognizes the most sublime heroism in deeds which failed to achieve their purpose, perhaps inevitably. And when we construct our ideal paradises of goodness in the future, we are apt to find we have left out the very possibility of that losing battle against overwhelming odds which constitutes the very essence of moral grandeur.

Thus we have reached three great principles or laws of the relation of fact to value or of existence to goodness. *First*, that which exists can only be explained or ultimately understood when it is seen as expressing or contributing to the expression of goodness. *Second*, that in our world we learn about both what exists and what is good through their mutual opposition. *Third*, that, so far as this world is concerned, although goodness is expressed or embodied in what exists, that expression is never complete or final, but at its highest rests also upon a certain unreconciled conflict between what is and what should be.

The central problem of all rational metaphysics is, I take it, to penetrate to the vision of an order which can hold together and harmonize those three divergent principles of human experience and thought.

Of all non-Christian philosophies Platonism has made the most sustained and heroic efforts in this direction. For it the Idea of the Good is the ultimate ground and explanation of all things. But the world of ideas, in which the Idea of the Good is supreme, is different from the world of time and space and sense-perception in which we live our bodily lives. The ideas are partially expressed in spatio-temporal phenomena, but partially fail of expression through the defects of the medium. And thus the phenomenal world is at best a schooling whereby the soul's eye may be trained to turn from the deceitful appearances of sense to catch glimpses of the eternal verities which have their true being elsewhere.

Thus the three great principles appear to be saved; yet only, as closer inspection shows, by confusion of thought. For, on the one hand, if the heavenly world of ideas is really perfect apart from the earthly world of sense, it is impossible to conceive how the latter could have come into existence even as an illusion, seeing that the idea of the Good must be ultimately its ground. If, on the other hand, the world of sense is necessary to the world of ideas, the self-subsistent perfection of the latter vanishes, and therewith the whole point of the contrast between the two worlds.

The fundamental defect of Platonism as a philosophy is probably this, that its point of view is too exclusively gnostic.

It subordinates too completely doing to knowing. Consequently, it undervalues time and historical process. It seeks a revelation of God, but not a redemption. Or rather, revelation is the only redemption of which it feels the need.

But Christianity brings a gospel not only of God partially expressed or revealed in the world and perfectly in heaven, but also a gospel of communion with God achieved through conflict with this world, in such wise that the full glory of that communion is in part constituted even by the very unsuccess of the conflict upon earth. And not only does the whole process of the self-expression of God in this world come to a climax in the Incarnation, but also the whole process of the conflict against the world comes to a climax in the Cross, which by God's own act for ever characterizes the very glory of God Himself, in being the instrument of His redeeming love. Thus it becomes conceivable and intelligible that God, for the perfect expression of His own Being, should have created a world which gave opportunity for evil, so that, through the evil redeemed in conflict and suffering, the fullest of all perfection might be realized.

If such be the ultimate principle of the world-order, the religious experience of the Christian may throw its light more widely than we are apt to imagine. The created world is from God and from the beginning manifests His goodness. Yet as soon as life is found, it must maintain and develop itself by a strife in which sensitiveness to pain is a principal instrument of advance. Already there is a foreshadowing not only of the Incarnation, but of the Cross; there is an opposed environment wherein life itself must triumph through suffering and death. Then man appears in the very image of God, and forthwith appears also the moral evil which raises pain to higher possibilities both of sorrow and of service. Then the divine activity throughout this world of our experience is summed up in the life of Jesus Christ. And that epiphany, just in proportion to its perfectness, must in the medium of space and time be transitory and unsuccessful. The Son of Man must suffer. The Incarnation in this world can have no issue save on the Cross. Yet the Cross does but impress with its seal the heavenly body which into a world beyond space and time rises from the tomb. And in rising again Christ gives us the key to that order which space and time were themselves created to fulfil. Space and time are conditions necessary for that perfect self-expression of God which through Resurrection holds together both the Incarnation, which brings God to earth, and the Cross, whereby the divine goodness rejected upon earth makes that rejection the means of bringing earthly life back to heaven.

The Resurrection, then, is not merely one historical fact among others; it is the fact which manifests the ultimate law of all. Everything that is good on earth, in order to enter heaven, must in some sense receive that seal of the Cross which alone can raise it to immortality. That is why even in this earthly sphere all real advance is made not without sacrifice and suffering. The ceaseless quest for worthier and more abundant life in all its manifold forms, from the lower stages of evolution, up to modern man's struggles for a millennium upon earth, is constantly bringing life itself into jeopardy, and constantly leaving broken by the wayside those who seemed to be its noblest pioneers. Will the quest ever reach its goal in the history of earth? And, if not, was it from the beginning a vanity and a striving after wind? The Christian can say No to both those questions. The search will never find its goal on earth; for it is looking for heaven. Yet all the pain and disappointment to which it leads may be incorporated by God into His noblest work, the atonement of suffering love, declared once for all in the life and death of Jesus Christ. It is the shadow of His Cross, cast over the whole story of earthly life, which enables it to reach its end in that which is beyond earth, and so to make God's work in creation perfect.

A host of unsolved problems and difficulties spring to the mind at once. Yet, looking at our experience from this angle, we do seem to see in a fresh light those three laws of the relation between existence and goodness, fact and value, which before it seemed so hard to reconcile. (1) All reality must ultimately be explained by its goodness. All things finally serve to perfect the good order of God. It is an indication of this ultimate truth that even here and now our minds come to rest in satisfaction when, and only when, we appreciate the goodness of things. And it is a foreshadowing of eternity that in the highest and intensest forms of such experience our consciousness of the passage of time tends to disappear; we are no longer expecting, but rapt in contemplation. (2) Yet in our present life we learn of what exists and of what is good by their mutual opposition. There is the mark of the Cross upon the life of the intellect. If in the end we would be fit to contemplate reality as God's, we must first be loyal enough in faith not to colour existing facts with our poor wishes, but to acknowledge what we would fain ignore. The suffering which such discipline involves is the only way to the pure sincerity of that love which in the end rejoices with the truth. (3) And, so learning, we can find nothing upon earth in which our minds can rest with final satisfaction. For life in space and time is not meant to be *learning* only. It is as we *spend* ourselves by

God's help to fashion the things of earth more in accordance with His Will, that we work under Him, whether by success or failure, to make earthly life fulfil its end through the sacrifice of itself. Heaven, the world of resurrection, is beyond earth. Yet heaven is not simply after earth, but includes it, even as we believe that the life of God's Word for ever includes the temporal experience in which the man Jesus Christ suffered and died upon the Cross. Thus earthly existence even in passing away with pain and struggle completes the eternity of heaven with the offering of that sacrifice of which space and time were the conditions.

We are getting far out of our depth. But in all metaphysical matters it is enough for us if we can be sure that it is a real depth of mystery, and not a bottomless pit of idle verbiage, into which we have fallen. And all I have sought to do is to suggest that the torch of Christian faith may illuminate more dark corners than we think, if only our reasons wield it bravely.

Traditional Catholicism has asserted that the rational foundations of theism stand sure apart from the Christian revelation. There is, on the other hand, a school of modern Protestantism which seems to maintain that only through Jesus Christ, or through the Christian experience, have we any real knowledge of God. Each in its own way warns off the reason from its sacred ground. And both perhaps hinder the construction of that radically Christian metaphysic which would enable the mind to see the order of all reality in the light which Christ has shed.

THE DOCTRINE OF THE INCARNATION IN RELATION TO MODERN PHILOSOPHY*

I.

THE subject on which I was asked to lecture at Cambridge during the Vacation term for Biblical Study was in itself a very great one, but it presented certain features of peculiar difficulty. The subject was The Incarnation in the Light of Modern Philosophy, which, I suppose, ought to imply that modern philosophy sheds a light upon the doctrine of the Incarnation. If it does so, it would certainly be true to say that the light comes obliquely, or, if we may rather change the metaphor, that such contributions as modern philosophy makes

* Adapted with considerable modifications from lectures given during the Vacation Term for Bible Study at Cambridge, August, 1927.

have to be picked up as and where we can. The fact is there is no really searching investigation of the doctrine of the Incarnation in modern philosophy. Of course there are certain presuppositions and commitments in connexion with the doctrine, which have been investigated by modern philosophers, and on which modern philosophers have formed certain conclusions. By which I do not imply that all modern philosophers have formed the same conclusions, which is very definitely not the case. But by some distinguished philosophers the doctrine of the Incarnation has, to this extent, been repudiated, in so far as they have repudiated necessary presuppositions of the doctrine of the Incarnation. So it would be needless for them to explore the doctrine any further, and we must not expect from them any help towards our own scrutiny of the doctrine. A very interesting example of that fact may be found in the August number of THEOLOGY. In it there is a review by Professor A. E. Taylor of a volume of collected Essays of the late Dr. Bosanquet entitled *Science and Philosophy and Other Essays*. In the course of this review Professor Taylor speaks as follows: "It is plain that Bosanquet sincerely regarded religion, and, apparently, Christianity, as the most precious feature of the life of the spirit. But the religion thus recognized is a religion without any of the great ideas which have been the dynamic of living historical faiths, without the transcendence of God, the real contrast between nature and supernature, or nature and grace, without the spirit of *adoration*, and consequently without any institutional or authoritarian elements." Now Dr. Bosanquet was a very distinguished representative of the School which may be spoken of as the School of Objective or Absolute Idealism, but it is quite plain that it would be vain to expect from Dr. Bosanquet any contributions towards our understanding of the Christian view of the Incarnation. His view of religion or of the philosophy of religion rules out the possibility of any such doctrine as that which forms the intellectual and institutional centre of the Christian faith—that is, the centre of the Christian faith both for thought and for its practical expression in the worshipping community. But even philosophers who are not as detached from the doctrine as Dr. Bosanquet was, even the philosophers who do not disallow those presuppositions which are involved in the doctrine, such presuppositions as ethical monotheism and the supreme value of personality, and the idea of a clash between a God conceived of in personal terms and the evil of the world—such philosophers, for instance, as the late Professor of Mental Philosophy at Cambridge, Dr. James Ward—rarely seem to consider how the doctrine of the Incarnation may affect or modify their

world-view. There is, as it appears to me, something in the philosophical atmosphere which prevents the doctrine from receiving that attention which its own impressiveness and the weight of the evidence in favour of it would lead us to expect. There are certain words of Bishop Gore in his *Belief in God* which are very relevant in this connexion. He is speaking on the question of a self-revealing God. He writes as follows: "What I think is amazing is how little the modern, intellectual world, which claims to be, and appears to be, seeking God with all seriousness—how little it faces the question of positive divine self-revelation." We may recall the symposium of a number of distinguished literary persons who communicated to the *Daily Express* about two years ago their views on the subject of religion or, more precisely, on their own personal religion, communications later published in a volume called *My Religion*. One of the most marked features of that symposium was the excessive individualism of most of the contributors. The idea of objective truth as something which is really rather more than a question of taste did not seem to some of them to have any particular meaning or relevance, and I think a very natural conclusion would be that there was no particular reason for supposing that what most of these distinguished writers said had any very close connexion with objective truth. Now that, perhaps, may be pardoned among persons whose strong card is literature rather than philosophy, but I am bound to say that something of the same kind seems to be true now and then of philosophers; they do not take into account what deserves to be taken into account; and I am sure that the doctrine of the Incarnation ought to be subjected to a much more thorough-going and careful scrutiny than I have been able to discover to be the case in modern philosophy.

Let us first of all detach ourselves from modern philosophy and look at the present state of affairs in connexion with the doctrine, and see how the question "What think ye of Christ?" remains the outstanding question within Christianity, a question, that is, to which a definite answer, if a definite answer is possible, has to be given. What I wish to do is to consider first of all the present state of criticism, and subsequently what I may call the religious question, that is, the question of the relevance of the person of Jesus to Christianity as a religion of a particular and distinctive character, and then, finally, to see how these two questions—the critical question and the religious question—run up into the dogmatic question. And it is the answer which is given to the dogmatic question which forms, as it were, the coping-stone of the arch of Christian thought and Christian experience.

First, the relevance of the person of Christ for the Christian religion can be challenged in the sort of way in which Professor Josiah Royce does, in effect, challenge it in his *Problem of Christianity* only if certain assumptions are granted. Professor Royce refused to entertain for himself any hypothesis as to how the Christian community originated, and so did, in effect, give up the whole question as one to which it was impossible to return any satisfactory or convincing answer. He concentrated entirely upon the *de facto* existence of the Christian community, leaving the person of the Founder practically upon one side. Now that kind of attitude is justifiable only if our records are utterly unreliable, or if they are only fragments of an obscure character and do not give us anything of the nature of a whole and satisfactory picture of the central figure of our religion, or if they present a figure whose foundational connexion with the religion named after Him is unwarranted by the records. Let us see how each of these assumptions would work out. The first assumption, that our records are utterly unreliable, might lead to the Christus-myth position, to the view that, in point of fact, Jesus never lived at all. The second assumption, that all that we have are a number of obscure and incoherent fragments, might lead, not necessarily to a denial of the existence of our Lord, but to an attitude of great scepticism as to whether there is really anything we can say about Him with any assurance that what we say represents the truth. While the third assumption, that the religion named after Him has no real connexion with Him, that is with the Jesus of history, would lead to a sharp distinction or might lead to a sharp distinction between Jesus and Christ, the sort of sharp distinction which came to a head in the volume called *Jesus or Christ* issued as a supplement to the *Hibbert Journal* in the year 1910. Now it is interesting to observe that none of these conclusions follows from the most notable recent English criticisms of the Gospels. Three examples of that fact may be given: we may take first of all Canon Streeter's analysis of the framework of the Synoptic Gospels in his book *The Four Gospels*. He argues for a four-document hypothesis. The documents are our old friend Q, St. Mark, our new friend proto-Luke and a very new friend called "M," who is the source of the discourses and parables peculiar to St. Matthew. Canon Streeter suggests that in their original documentary forms they represented the traditions of various churches, and as a result of his analysis he speaks as follows: "The final result of the critical analysis which has led to our formulating the Four-Document Hypothesis is very materially to broaden the basis of evidence for the authentic teaching of Christ." While he speaks of the teaching rather

than of the life of our Lord, yet since in his judgment the Synoptic Gospels contain in their various strata traditions of great weight as to what Jesus Christ actually taught, a further deduction may reasonably be drawn.

Secondly, there is Dr. Rawlinson's *Commentary on St. Mark*. In the introduction to it he criticizes what used to be called the Marcan hypothesis, namely that in this Gospel we can find the framework for the Gospel narrative and an orderly development of the facts in the life of our Lord. He criticizes that view and lays great emphasis upon the religious motives which actuated the evangelist in writing. The independence and objectivity of his treatment add weight to his conclusions. Speaking of the faith of the earliest believers he says that it "originated in the facts: it did not arise out of the air: it was called forth by an actual Person." So he continues "The Gospel narrative" . . . was "the outcome of a generally historical tradition," and he describes the portrait of Jesus in the Gospel as a "convincing portrait."

My third witness is a Cambridge scholar—Sir Edwyn Hoskyns. He, in his contribution to *Essays Catholic and Critical*, lays stress upon the great contrast in the Synoptic Gospels between the Christ humiliated and the Christ returning in glory, and with regard to that contrast this is his judgment: "This was the Gospel proclaimed by Jesus, and these were the claims made by the Jesus of history for Himself and for His disciples." Now in what I have quoted I have set forth the opinions of three distinguished scholars. These opinions clearly involve the conclusion that the Gospels are not incoherent fragments, that the Gospels contain historical matter of the greatest value, that they present a true picture of our Lord. It is, further, directly stated by Dr. Rawlinson, and implied by Sir Edwyn Hoskyns, that that picture of our Lord is the legitimate *prius* of that Christian doctrine of the Incarnation which culminated in the statement of the Nicene Council in its creed; that Christ is of one substance with the Father. They would not say, and we certainly should be wise not to say, that all critical questions have been cleared up either as to Gospel-origins or as to the historical worth of the Gospels. But this at least we may say; that there is no lack of backing in the modern study of the Gospels for a remarkable statement made in Canon Streeter's later book *Reality*. There Canon Streeter says that Christ is "not only a representative symbol of the divine," but "representation and reality are of the same stuff." "The life of Christ is qualitatively homogeneous with the infinite life." Now that is an excellent illustration of what the Nicene Fathers meant when they put the word ὁμοούσιος into

the Creed; they meant that the life of Christ was positively homogeneous with the infinite life. This is the conclusion to which Canon Streeter comes, and it has as its background his own precise and detailed investigation of the Gospels.

We now pass, secondly, to the religious question. The religious question concerns the centrality of Christ in Christian experience, which means that His person is the keystone of the wide arch of that experience. Here it is obviously impossible not to say a further word about Professor Royce's attempt to substitute the beloved community as the central Christian idea or fact for Jesus Christ. He does, in effect, make a sharp contrast between the Christian community and one who is thought of as the founder of the community or of the religion. Now the inadequacy of that position of Royce's can, I think, be seen clearly if one remembers that there would have been no beloved community apart from the belief of the community that there was a beloved Son. If we cannot believe that, it seems to me that we cannot believe anything in the New Testament. It is quite plain that whatever be the place which the idea of Himself as the beloved Son occupied in our Lord's consciousness (and it appears to me extraordinarily difficult to deny that that was exactly how Jesus thought of Himself), when we pass to those New Testament documents which are so greatly concerned with the life and thought of the Christian community, there can be no question of the fact and importance of the community's loyalty to one who, being Himself the beloved Son, had revealed God, and brought God near to the community, in a way to which there was no previous parallel. To drive a wedge between Jesus and the community is really impossible. The importance of the community is clear from what St. Paul says: "The Church is His body, the fullness of Him who is being all in all fulfilled." But that does not allow us to say that either in the New Testament or for own thought the whole emphasis can be laid upon the community, and that the question of what Jesus was and what he taught in His historical life is of comparative unimportance.

The testimony of Christian experience at this point is unassailable in its relevance, which does not mean, of course, that experience is necessarily to be regarded as giving a true account of its own origin. That is another matter. I think we may for our purpose rest quite content with what Dr. C. D. Broad has said in the supplementary volume of the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society called *Methods of Analysis*. Three papers were read on the subject of the validity of belief in a personal God, and Dr. Broad had occasion to criticize severely the paper of Dr. Stocks, who laid great stress upon the arguments for

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experience. Dr. Broad would not allow that the fact of experience really gave any means of testing the validity of the experience. But what he does say is of interest: "Suppose we admit, as I am inclined to do, that there is a specific kind of attitude called the religious attitude." Now I should cross the t's of that statement in reference to our subject by saying that in Christianity the religious attitude has been from the first an attitude towards Christ, and that the more the weight is laid upon religious experience the more impossible becomes a Christianity without Christ as its centre. That is, to conceive of Christianity as merely a specialized version of theism, or as a moral or social code, is to do grave injustice to that specific religious attitude which we can discover in connexion with the early history of Christianity; and if one thinks of the Christian worship, this becomes all the clearer. No one would, I suppose, deny that in early Christianity the Lord's Supper or the Eucharist was the centre of the worshipping life of the beloved community; but the Eucharist means nothing at all apart from a distinctive religious attitude to the Founder of the religion. Take away from the tenth and eleventh chapters of the first epistle to the Corinthians the whole idea of the peculiar dependence of the community upon the person of Christ and the impartation to it of the life of the Founder, and what is left? Nothing at all. It is impossible to understand the Eucharist as a distinctive act of the beloved community without at once falling back upon the special place occupied in the thought and adoration of the community by the person of Jesus Christ.

Then, thirdly, these two questions, the critical and the religious, lead inevitably to the dogmatic question. Only through a dogmatic answer can the data of criticism and experience be brought to a coherent explanation. One of the things which seems to be quite true about dogma is that it represents again and again the last word of coherent thinking. Dogma is not the peculiar naughtiness of theologians; dogma is the attempt of the community to understand the whole character of its own life, not simply its reaction in worship but also its reaction in thinking. We can appreciate this dogmatic question with some clearness if we compare the problem of Socrates or of St. Paul or of Napoleon with the problem of Jesus Christ. The problem of Socrates or of St. Paul or of Napoleon as great and influential personalities can be, I will not say solved, but can anyhow be adequately understood, without raising the question of the relation of any of them to God. But that is not true with regard to the problem of Jesus, because the problem of Jesus as it is revealed in criticism and experience *is* the problem of the relation of Jesus to God. A comparison may be

made between our Lord's person and the Old Testament. Old Testament history is unintelligible apart from the constant recollection of its theocentric character. Whether the Israelites were right or wrong about the matter, there is at least no doubt that they thought of the history of their nation in terms of the relationship of the nation to God—in these terms and in these terms only. Similarly, in regard to the person of Jesus we cannot begin to discuss the problem of Jesus, to try and find His place in history, without immediately raising the question of the relationship between Him and God, because it is out of that relation or that supposed relation between Him and God that His influence upon history has flowed: if we strike that out of the person and life of Jesus, nothing remains. There are two illustrations of that fact which I should like to give from two comparatively recent books, one English and one German. Dr. Sidney Cave, in what, I think, is the latest monograph upon the history of the doctrine of the person of Christ, speaks of Jesus as one in whom "there was the dignity of one who knew Himself to be in a unique relationship with God and called to do for God a unique work. We cannot abstract His message from His person. His proclamation of God and God's kingdom was inseparably connected with Himself and cannot be understood apart from Him." The other quotation is from the little book entitled *Systematic Theology*, which is, in effect, a compilation from the lecture notes of one whom I was privileged to know some twenty years ago—Wilhelm Herrmann. It has been translated into English, and Herrmann, whilst making a cleavage between the experimental knowledge of Christ's divinity and its dogmatic expression, says that, in the fact which confronts faith in the person of Jesus, "we confess that He stands in a relation to God different from that of any other man." And that is the distinction—to which we must come from whatever side we approach it—between the problem of the person of Jesus and the problem of the person of Socrates or of St. Paul or of Napoleon. Now this dogmatic problem—the Christological problem—has been the dogmatic problem of Christianity from the first. It was already so in the life of Jesus Christ, and because He had given the answer to our problem He went to His death. "Art Thou the Son of the Living God?" "I am," or, "Ye say that I am": it does not matter which form of the tradition we take. There is no doubt why Jesus was put to death. There is, I suppose, no reasonable doubt that He could have avoided that death by avowing, for instance, that He was simply a prophet. Now with this problem and its particular solution in the Christology of the Church there is directly given the Christian answer to some of the questions

which arise in philosophical theism—questions as to the nature of God, as to God's relation to the world, and as to revelation.

An interaction between the Christian answer to the questions which arise around the person of Christ and the questions which philosophy poses is inevitable, though it may at certain times be difficult to see how that interaction takes effect. To some philosophical problems religious beliefs seem to be quite irrelevant, but if we take the view of Professor J. S. Mackenzie in the *Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics*, we shall agree that the idea of two truths, one philosophical and one theological, is impossible. Mackenzie says that "the subject of metaphysics is the most fundamental problems of knowledge and reality." But clearly theology is not inattentive to the most fundamental problems of knowledge and reality. We cannot have one true answer from the philosophical side and one from the theological; what is true in the one sphere must be true in the other; as, in another of the supplementary volumes of the Aristotelian Society, *The Concepts of Continuity*, Professor de Burgh says, "The hypothesis of a double truth is not tenable for an instant." But one of the difficulties when we pass to modern philosophy is that we are confronted with that dry epigram of Dr. Matthews, the Dean of King's College, London: "There is no modern philosophy, there are only modern philosophers," in other words the old grand idealistic tradition of such men as T. H. Green, Edward Caird, Mr. Bradley and Dr. Bosanquet has been challenged. A general statement about modern philosophy is open to grave objection. And so a statement of the relation of modern philosophy to Christian doctrine is difficult and is the more difficult because, as Professor de Burgh has said, "philosophers and theologians have moved on divergent paths for more than three centuries." In an inaugural address which he gave to the Aristotelian Society he has shown himself alive to the need for more co-operation between philosophers and theologians, and I think it would be extraordinarily interesting if he were successful in inducing his colleagues of the Aristotelian Society to turn their attention in the direction of the doctrine of the Incarnation. In conclusion I would call attention to four beliefs to which Christian theology is committed in connexion with the doctrine of the Incarnation. First stands belief in the transcendence of God. This cannot be surrendered without changing the substance and not simply the form of Christian doctrine. I do not see how we can be content with such a phrase as "the self-transcendence of immanent process," used by Mr. Hanson in his contribution to the symposium of the Aristotelian Society on "The Idea of a Transcendent Deity." I do not wish to imply that Mr. Hanson finds no further meaning

in transcendence than what his phrase suggests; as to that he leaves me in doubt. But I am sure that a further meaning is necessary if the doctrine of the Incarnation is to be given its true presuppositions in a doctrine of God. That doctrine, in its transcendent aspect, Baron von Hügel asserts and expounds when, in his review of Dr. Pringle-Pattison's Gifford Lectures on *The Idea of God*, he argues that there can be no overlapping of existence in respect of God and men, that the divine life is self-sufficient, and that God for His perfection or His self-consciousness does not need the universe or creatures. Some theologians would wish to make certain qualifications of von Hügel's statements, but his main contention is wholly in line with the classical tradition of Christian theology.

Secondly, and in close relation to the first belief, stands the belief in divine personality. How great is the need for a careful expression of this truth, and for the avoidance of such a crude phrase as "God is a Person," has been clearly shown in Professor Webb's Gifford Lectures, *God and Personality*. But the truth itself is vital to Christianity. Moreover, it is not possible for Christian theology to seek to come to terms with certain philosophical tendencies by admitting that the personal God of its creed is a finite God. Professor Webb has argued against the distinction sometimes drawn between God and the Absolute that it "makes nonsense of religious experience." With this protest, both on the ground put forward by Professor Webb and for other reasons, Christian theology seems to me to be in full sympathy. It is, indeed, impossible to ignore the difficulties which beset the identification of God with the Absolute, when God is conceived of as Christian theology conceives of Him; but the refusal of the identification, and the retention of belief in divine personality, in close association with the admission that God is an element within the Absolute and that the Absolute is God *plus* finite centres or *plus* the world, means a movement away from the main currents of Christian thinking.

Thirdly, Christian theology cannot be satisfied with a conception of the Person of Christ which finds in Him simply an evolutionary climax in the history of human personality. Dr. W. R. Matthews in an important article on the Christological question in *The Future of Christianity* points out that such theories as those of Professor Alexander and M. Bergson "could provide a basis for a kind of doctrine of the Person of Christ." Christ could be regarded as "the first emergence of a new level of existence," but not as "the final manifestation of Deity." With this statement of Dr. Matthews I would compare what Dr. Relton has said in *Some Postulates of a Christian Philosophy*, that "the incarnation, if the idea is confined within current

evolutionary concepts, can only be the culmination of divine immanence." The idea of emerging evolution, of a *nisus* or thrust upwards towards Deity in the universe, does not, by itself, provide the conditions for a doctrine of incarnation. If we say that in Christ the highest example of divine immanence is given, then, if the word "incarnation" is retained, it is a doctrine of "diffused incarnation" which will be implied. But is "diffused incarnation" really incarnation at all? Is not von Hügel right when he says that "a real incarnation of God can only mean incarnation in some particular human nature"? Ruggiero's *Modern Philosophy* seems to imply something akin to the doctrine of diffused incarnation as the teaching of Croce. The whole revelation of God is given in history, no particular emphasis is laid upon the personality of the historic Christ, and the idea of divine transcendence is abandoned.

Finally, the doctrine of the Incarnation presupposes God's will to save a world entangled in evil. So much, at least, of a soteriology is involved. The Incarnation is an act of God for the salvation of the world. Any philosophical discussion of the doctrine must take full account of this fact. And at this point it is necessary to discriminate clearly between the Christian doctrine of the Incarnation, and of its climax in the Cross on the one hand, and modern theories, to which some eminent philosophers have subscribed, of "a suffering God" on the other. It is quite impossible, in view of Christian tradition, to say that the Christian doctrine necessarily involves the acceptance of the idea of "a suffering God." The most one can say is that some modern theologians see a real connexion, and effect a unification in their soteriology. But the background to some modern assertions of divine passibility is such a necessarily close connexion between God and the world as fails to do justice either to Christian emphasis on divine transcendence or to the Christian faith that all that God does for the salvation of the world proceeds from his free, unconstrained, graciousness. The Incarnation and the Cross are not methods of salvation which the sufferings of the world impose upon God, nor may they be assumed to be manifestations of what God has suffered through the ages.

Any philosophical discussion of the doctrine of the Incarnation must not ignore the contexts of Christian theology within which the doctrine has developed and taken shape.

J. K. MOZLEY.

ST. PAUL AMONG THE JEWS*

A New Drama (I)

This is the title of a drama by Franz Werfel (*Paulus unter den Juden*). The author is one of the most original of all modern German poets. His drama, which was published last year, gives in what he calls six "pictures" a powerful dramatic presentation of the great historic moment when Christianity liberated itself from the swaddling bands of Judaism. The scene is laid in Jerusalem during the time of Caius Caligula. The Procurator of Judea was then Marullus, the successor of Pontius Pilate, a suave and wily politician, who, while making a pretence of ardent friendship to the representative Jews and a love for the Jewish people, in reality regards them with contempt and uses their internal disturbances to bring about their destruction.

The play opens in the Prætorium in Jerusalem. Herod's palace has been put at the disposal of the Roman Governor during the periods of his residence when he comes from Cæsarea to the Holy City to attend to his duties as Judge and to be present at the most important Jewish Feasts and Fasts. It is just a few days before the Day of Atonement, and Marullus is entertaining the most important personages among the Jews in the banqueting hall of the palace. The High Priest is the chief guest. He has two sons, the elder of whom, Chanan, has become, through the influence of Saul of Tarsus, the leader of the Zealots. Chanan has by some means or other got a Jew, named Pinchas, into his power. This Pinchas has sold himself to the enemy, as it were, for he wears the uniform of an official of the Roman Empire, and holds a position of trust in the household of Marullus. His bearing continually expresses a desire to remain unnoticed, for his uniform embarrasses him, making him an object of contempt among his fellow-Jews.

Chanan questions him concerning the preparations for an effort at rebellion against Rome which is to take place soon, and which Pinchas is to aid materially by filching the keys of the gates of the city and so allowing three hundred rebels from Galilee to enter Jerusalem unchallenged. For during the Feasts the guard at the city gates was reinforced and each person entering was closely examined. Pinchas is full of fears at being questioned in this spot where he may so easily be overheard. Yet he has so great a love for Chanan and is also so over-

* One of the Boys Lectures on "St. Paul in Jewish Thought," delivered in September at the Church of St. Martin's-in-the-Fields by the Rev. Paul P Levertoff.

powered by the strong fanatical nature of the High Priest's son that he has done what is required of him, and takes a secret pleasure in his cupidity.

He is much frightened, however, when Chanan demands that even a greater task should be performed, namely, that he should procure the key of the arsenal for the period during which the three hundred would be entering the city. Pinchas turns the conversation to Saul of Tarsus, who has disappeared from among the Zealots whom he had joined, on finding them not zealous enough for him.

Chanan expresses perfect faith in his teacher Saul, vowing that he will return and be stronger than ever in his struggle for the purification of Israel. Pinchas, however, professes great admiration for Rabbi Gamaliel, and teases Chanan concerning Saul's disloyalty to his teacher. Their conversation is interrupted by the entrance of Marullus with the High Priest into the garden from the banqueting hall.

Marullus is pictured as being a stout, bland, middle-aged man; the High Priest as old, tired, and dignified. Their conversation turns upon the question of the entry of the new regiments into Jerusalem. The High Priest is urgent in his desire to be assured that the ensigns, effigies, and eagles of Cæsar will not be brought into the city by the troops. These are the symbols of Cæsar's claim to divinity, and it is most important that Jerusalem should not be defiled by idols. He insists on the privileges of the Jews in the Empire, especially in Jerusalem. Marullus seeks to turn him to other issues. "What you call Law I shall never grasp." The High Priest refuses to be drawn. Marullus boasts of his love for the Jews and of the forbearance of Rome. "I respect your prohibition concerning strangers entering the Temple, although according to it I, the Procurator, would be accounted guilty of death were I to enter your sanctuary. But I am not offended; on the contrary, I ordered the execution, without mercy, of that legionary who tore up one of your scrolls."

High Priest: And how many Jews are executed every day in the Roman Empire who have not torn your *earthly* scrolls of the law?

Marullus: My most worthy Theophilus, surely thou canst not seriously consider Romans and Jews equal.

High Priest (*with closed eyes*): No!

Marullus: Our benevolence has been richly demonstrated.

High Priest: And so the images and ensigns will remain away?

Marullus (*ignoring the question*): As far as I am concerned, I wish all the high places were full of columns and images. Dreary land and gloomy people! Your animus against images comes from your gloomy nature.

High Priest: We have the Temple and the Word!

Marullus: The Temple is a gold and crystal glory in the sun. Yet I shudder and yearn for our faultless youths and maids in marble.

High Priest: Behold, even idolatry ye do not take seriously!

Marullus: But Art!

High Priest: What is Art? The most hypocritical kind of lasciviousness.

Marullus (*very politely*): There are things, O most worthy Theophilus, that even a Jew cannot grasp.

High Priest: The people tremble for the Law.

Marullus: Very strange. This people, that strives for the overthrow of the laws of all nations, trembles for the upkeep of their own! There are movements among you . . .

High Priest (*breaking in impatiently*): Thou meanest the Nazareans?

Marullus: I mean not only those harmless sects.

High Priest: We respect Rome while Rome respects the Torah. A proof of our good-will I bring thee now, Marullus. The community of Jericho presents thee with the villa of Cleopatra as a winter residence.

Marullus (*with twitching eyes*): They think I am corruptible?

High Priest (*with a touch of contempt*): Oh, but Marullus! . . .

Marullus (*rudely and lightly*): Just because I am not corruptible, I will accept this present. . . . (*In a more serious tone*) I thank thee with a warning, most worthy Theophilus. Cæsar is very sensitive about his divinity. It is only due to my influence and to my superhuman endeavour that we usually succeed . . . and we shall succeed this time too, that no other effigy of Cæsar shall be found in Jerusalem than the golden eagle on the outer Temple-gate. But listen! When I passed that eagle yesterday a stone was thrown at it which happily touched only the gate. This offence is trite and vulgar, O Theophilus! But it is extremely dangerous.

High Priest: Do not worry! No ensigns! Thou hast given me back my sleep.

Marullus: I am thy warmest friend. And now I invite thee to the hall where they are expecting us.

(*The High Priest waves his hand. Two Levites with torches appear, who come to his side. He goes off with them to the right. Marullus goes after him.*)

Then enters Mathias, the younger son of the High Priest, a dissipated young man who apes every Gentile mode of life and attire, and rebels against everything Jewish. With him is Aulus Frisius, a handsome Scandinavian giant, wearing the uniform of a Roman commander. Mathias, small and feeble, is lost in admiration of the other's physique. He expresses his admiration for everything Roman and his hatred of things Jewish. Frisius is amazed to hear that he desires all the empty pleasures of the Pagan world, he, a son of the High Priest. Frisius, on the contrary, is deeply impressed by Judaism; "Rome is great, but Sion fills me with awe." The Temple, Gamaliel, the whole atmosphere of Jerusalem, awaken in him a mystic longing.

Chanan interrupts the scene. Mathias cringes in fear.

Again Frisius is amazed to find rebellion, in another form, in *this* son of the High Priest. Chanan mocks the gay apparel of his brother, he himself is wearing the coarse peasant cloak of the Zealots. Shortly afterwards Pinchas enters, in time to prevent a conflict between the two brothers.

As they retire, the High Priest comes into the garden from the banqueting-hall. He immediately expresses disgust at the dress of each. Mathias he asks, "Where sleepest thou at night?" and Chanan, "Who is thine intimate friend since Saul left thee?" Both are silent. The sad old man sees the gulf that lies between himself and his sons, between all he stands for and their rebelliousness, and his heart overflows with pain and weariness. He envies Gamaliel, who, free from the burden of office, can live entirely in the atmosphere of sanctity and peace. He deplores this spirit of unrest and dissension that has crept into Jewry, of which his sons are such vivid examples. "I stretch out my hands to my children, and they do not clasp them." "Rome clasps them," answers Chanan ironically. And Mathias, "We are God's culprits continually, and I want to live, to live!" The High Priest cries despairingly: "Lord of the world! Why are a man's children the distortion of his own self?"

The entrance of Marullus and the Jewish notables from the banqueting-hall interrupts the scene. Marullus is praising the moderation of his Jewish guests in the matter of the wine cup. He has evidently drunk deeply, but carries it well enough. The High Priest introduces his sons, and Marullus avows his delight in constantly serving the House of the High Priest. Frisius enters with the list of the newcomers to the city for the Day of Atonement celebrations, among whom is Saul of Tarsus. "Who knows Rabbi Saul?" enquires Marullus. Amid some whispering, Chanan speaks up: "I." "Thou knowest this person? Here, Frisius, continue to do thy best for the safety (turning to the guests) of our friends." Then (turning to Chanan), "My dear Chanan, why didst thou blush so?"

Chanan (*looking fixedly at Marullus*): I *did* blush.
Marullus: Is he a reliable man, this thy . . .
Chanan (*in a resolute voice*): Saul.
Marullus: Pardon me! What is it that excites thee?
Chanan (*after a pause, his eyes all the while on Marullus*): The hope of Israel. . . .

That ends the first "picture."

The second scene is set in one of those dark tunnels familiar to the East which serve as shelters from the intense heat. Here low stools and tables and small rugs are spread about for the

convenience of those who come to chat or intrigue. At the end of the tunnel is seen one of the steep streets reached by numerous steps out of the tunnel. The bright dazzling daylight contrasts sharply with the dim twilight of the tunnel, in which two Roman soldiers discuss Jerusalem and the oddities of the Jewish people. As they talk, Barnabas enters with a Nazarean woman. They speak about Paul, who is evidently lying sick in some upper room where the woman has been looking after him. She is afraid of Paul's violence. "An evil angel torments him. Hast thou seen how crazy are his eyes and how his fists are clenched, his lips all crooked and his dreadful voice when he cried: 'Flesh, O thou my body of death!' and 'Christ, smite him'? I tremble at the thought of going up to him."

Barnabas: The attack is becoming milder already.

Woman: Can this man become mild? He rages even in his impotence; and how he raged, as a zealot, against the Church, and fell upon the brethren and dragged them to prison! And did he not with his own hand lead Stephen, the saint, a relative of mine, to be stoned, against the will of the people? Can I forget?

Barnabas: Woman, I tell thee, a wonderful act of grace and a miracle from our Lord has been wrought. He there, and not the disciples, has received the last and greatest commission from the Christ. Be thou silent in awe. We have been commanded to love our enemies, but still more to treat tenderly those that are repentant. . . . I will now fetch the saints, and keep thou faithful watch over him. Maranatha!

Woman (reascending the steps): Maranatha!

As they pass out, Chanan and Pinchas appear from one of the dark passages opening into the sides of the tunnel. Chanan angrily complains that Pinchas has not found his teacher and friend Saul. Pinchas declares he has searched everywhere except among the Christians: "I believe it is not he who has come, but another." As they speak, a grim black figure is blocked in the doorway. It is the Rabbi Exorcist of whom Pinchas says: "The terrible man who keeps all the six hundred and thirteen commandments and their children and children's children. Since he observes them all, God cannot do anything to him!"

The two soldiers have been quietly conversing together all this time. As Chanan and Pinchas disappear, the Rabbi Exorcist comes forward. The soldiers gaze upon his tall figure in its white flowing robes, and black beard which sticks out of his hollow cheeks, his black eyebrows meeting over his nose. He walks in a manner that suggests that even his very steps seem to consider what is prohibited and what is not. The soldiers question him concerning Messiah's coming. "What is that to you? King Messiah cometh not *for* but *against* you,

when the Antichrist, may he be damned, has put his dissolute image in the Temple." When one of them asks, "Who is this Antichrist?" his answer is, "Thou servest him." As he speaks, a Galilean family, father, mother, and little son, enters the tunnel. They seat themselves. The soldiers ask plainly if the Rabbi means Cæsar. Immediately the Rabbi Exorcist wraps himself in a cloud of words, and leaves them to join the Galilean group. One of the soldiers says, "You will never discover what these people mean."

The Galileans prove to be wine-growers who have come to bring their first fruit-offering to the Temple, and also to find a teacher for their son, whom they are eager to place under Rabbi Gamaliel, of whom the Rabbi Exorcist is jealous. He frightens these simple people with his harsh words. He tells them that in Jerusalem their son will learn very easily how to become a Pagan. After some parley they decide to leave their son in the care of the Rabbi Exorcist, who very definitely tells them he will need payment. Rabbi Gamaliel teaches for love merely. "I receive payment, but not in order to keep the filthy lucre: I distribute it among the poor. But it is said, 'Acquire to thyself a teacher,' not 'find' but 'acquire.'"

Barnabas, Simon Peter, and James enter, and the Rabbi Exorcist commands the parents of the boy quickly to veil the child's face from these "Galilean rats, disciples of the Crucified One, who gnaw and spoil our Torah. The very sight of them brings defilement." They all retire from the scene. Simon Peter, James, and Barnabas have meanwhile seated themselves on some of the benches, and Barnabas places two bags on the table. They contain the joint wealth of Barnabas and Paul, which they desire to bring to the common purse. Simon Peter and James are depicted as upright labourers, whose faces "are transformed by an inner light." Simon Peter in his speech and actions is shown to be a man of tender heart, merciful, but distrustful of his own judgment regarding the sincerity of these two men, especially of Paul. James is harsh and suspicious, and very much a pious Jew in spite of the light of the Spirit. "How will ye live? From the churches?" he asks, not being ready to believe in the pure motives of these two aristocratic men of wealth. Peter fears Saul of Tarsus, the persecutor, the director of the stoning of Stephen. Is this not perhaps a new wile to catch Christians? Neither of them can truly believe that to Saul was vouchsafed a sight of the Risen Lord on the way to Damascus. "To no other did the Lord choose to appear but only to the stranger and enemy Saul!" says James. The latter is especially incredulous. It is vain for Barnabas to protest and to quote witnesses. "A scribe. Hm! We have

experienced a good deal of cunning already." When Barnabas tells them how broken is not only Paul's spirit now, but even his body—"When it comes over him, it is as though an imprisoned being, which abides in him, wishes to break its prison. He falls down, he moans, and convulsions shake the poor afflicted one"—James answers: "I, who call myself the brother of the Lord, have visions, I speak with tongues, I am in grace, and not possessed." At this last suggestion Peter is reproachful, he signifies his belief in Barnabas's story, and asks where the sufferer is. At this point the Nazarean woman comes rushing in to say, "The man is dead," meaning Paul. "His last word was not Christ," says she, "but Rabboni, my teacher."

Simon Peter and James rise in consternation, but Barnabas is calm and reassures them, and at that moment Paul appears at the top of the steps lately descended by the affrighted woman. She screams and flees. Paul, all emaciated and unkempt, comes down the steps and falls down at Peter's feet. "I know thee not, but thou art Peter!" (With failing voice) "O ye pillars, ye saints, ye His disciples!"

Peter: Rise, Paul!
Paul: How can I rise?
Peter (*full of emotion*): I will lift thee up! (*Does it.*)
Paul (*looks at him for a long time*): Simon, thou art good to me.
James (*disturbed*): What sayest thou? Seat thyself near us.
Paul: Ye, ye accompanied Him. In your eyes I find His image.
James: Thou findest Him whom thou hast persecuted?
Barnabas (*hastily*): Deal patiently with him!
Paul (*sinking his head*): Chastise me!
Peter (*compassionately*): Be of good cheer, Paul! I also, who was the first to have found Messiah, have denied him thrice.
James (*shamed, with a far-away look in his eyes*): And I, who saw the King of Israel when He was in His cradle, the silent child with eyes full of prophecy, I did not recognize Him. Pardon me that I reproached thee.
Paul: There—despair! Here—a new creation! *There* was Saul, a man who lived in Death, saw only Death, and since he saw only Death, he could not live; and as he could not live, he wrought the works of death. Ugh! out of all his dreams crept decay. Chastise me for that man's sake! At that time I deserted Gamaliel. Only a dead branch could drop away from such a master. But God wished that I should be dried up in order that I may burn now. I was quite empty and I filled my emptiness with hatred and proud dreams of Israel's victory. For how can an outcast live without an evil dream? There were the enemies of Israel round about. Jesus was an enemy! Look ye! And the enemy Stephen I bound and brought him here myself, so, so! And we dragged him to the gate. . . . (*Rising*) The first stone hit him! He closed his eyes and smiled. The second stone! Dumbly he lifted his arms. Hundreds of stones, all the stones! He looked at me, me, then he fell down in his blood. At me, the murderer, a new death smiled, a death which is eternal life. . . . (*He begins to tremble vehemently.*)

Peter: And before Damascus, Paul?

Paul: That look will never fade away. . . . The road of hell winds before me. . . . No! Not hell! For hell is *something*. . . . To the left and right of me there is an irretrievableness, that which has no word to express it. . . . But . . . (*He sinks down and hides his face.*)

Barnabas: Calm thyself, Paul! See how he trembles! The recollection of that miracle kills him.

Paul (*smiling through tears*): Kill me? How? I *was* dead.

James: Thou hast seen Him and heard His voice?

Peter: Speak! (*Paul attempts to speak, but fails. His lips move.*)

Paul: The defiance! The more defiant I became, the more patient was Rabban Gamaliel. I continued to be obstinate, but at home my soul pined more and more in misery, then I would be ill for days. But that's nothing, oh, nothing! This defiance against the Christ has melted away. But the sorrow, the bitter-sweet sorrow of the soul, will never end!

James: What dost thou wish in Jerusalem?

Paul: It is not I who govern myself any more. He who governs me commanded me to come. . . . When will He come again as He promised to you?

Peter: Even before this generation has tasted death. First the prophecy of the setting up of the abomination of the desolation in the Temple must be fulfilled. We shall experience it all in the flesh.

Paul: Then I must hasten! There is no time to spare! I must start at once!

Peter: Why? It is all one where the Day will find thee, which will come upon us like a snare.

Paul: The whole world believes itself to be Saul, and knows not that it is Paul. The time is short and this body of death is slothful! (*He glances at Peter.*) Ye were elected from the beginning. I am merely one of the saved. From the abyss come I, where souls perish. Hence I am to cry warning to mankind.

Peter: Where goest thou?

Paul: Who knows all of the great cities of the world?

James (*slyly*): Wilt thou go also to the Gentiles?

Paul: The Kingdom of God comes to all men.

Barnabas: And everywhere is the Kingdom of the poor.

James (*excitedly*): The Messiah Jesus lived within the Law. He preached to the lost sheep of Israel. He did not wish to cast the children's bread to the dogs.

Paul: Jesus, the Messiah, is above the Law! (*James starts to his feet.*)

Peter (*glancing round anxiously*): Righteous God! Speak softly, Paul. Thou wilt cause much confusion.

James (*angrily*): Nothing must thou do that will not be of service to the holy community. Beware, man! Have we suffered and bled, yea, through thy fault, that thou mightest be converted, only in order that thou destroy our work? With blood and wisdom have *we* created the Church of Messiah. She lives eternally in the Law of Moses. For the Lord Himself said: "Till earth and heaven pass away, not one jot or tittle shall pass away from the Law. . . ."

Paul: Did the Christ Himself perfectly comprehend the mystery of the Christ?

James: Now I have thee, Rabbi! Thou, the most conceited of all conceited ones! Blasphemest thou the Lord?

Paul: From the Torah it can be proven . . .

James: Thy pride can be proven, thine unconvertible pride!

Peter (moving away from Paul): At one time didst thou persecute us on the strength of the Torah!

James: Can a persecutor become a follower? A Saul can only become a Paul.

Paul: I have knelt before you and will kneel again. For ye were the companions of the Redeemer of Creation. But my office I have not received from man, but from the Christ who spake to me in His own voice.

James: *We* are the firstfruits of the Word. *Our* truth is truth without additions or changes. Jehoshua is the Messiah of the Law. For this we live, for this are we beaten mercilessly, for this we will suffer death, happy in our faith. Every other belief, every pandering to the uncircumcised world is disobedience. *I* am the head of the body. Mark ye, man! The disobedient is the enemy of Christ, whether he be converted or unconverted! Come, Simon! [*Exit.*

Peter: Brother! Thou art a scholar. But we were the eye-witnesses. Why argue? By the next Pasch everything may be over. Friend, visit us at our Holy Meal, in order that thou mayest learn to understand the community. [*Exit.*

Barnabas: Thou hast never before taught this, Paul—that Messiah is above the Law.

Paul: It is not I who uttered this awful word, but He Himself in me. I wished to be silent, but this word broke out of me. My heart is even now cold with fear.

Barnabas: Before, they were shy of thee, but now they hate thee, for they are Jews.

Paul: They cannot break free from the man in themselves. We alone, Barnabas, are to teach the universal Kingdom of the Christ.

Barnabas: The Kingdom of poverty, of equality, and of the Spirit.

Paul: I am so sad, brother! The Christ could not have sent me to the disciples. But to whom? To whom?

Barnabas: Trust me! . . . I will run after them, and will win them still. [*Exit Barnabas.*

Suddenly Chanan stands before him, saying, "Saul, I accuse thee." Hitherto Chanan has disguised his real fiery temperament under a cloak of gloomy calm. Now he is full of excitement. Paul murmurs, "God's trial begins." Chanan relates how all his enthusiasm has been aroused and fed by Saul, his friend, and now . . .? "O ghost of my old self," says Paul, "I look at thee, O my guilt." Chanan tells him how all their plans are ready. Thousands are marching through Jerusalem, men eager for the fray, and furnished with arms. All that was needed was the Leader, and now he, meaning Paul, has appeared. Paul is more and more conscience-stricken. Chanan is more and more puzzled. At last Paul bursts out: "Away from me. Depart from me; even if I could save the whole world, thee I cannot save. Thou abidest in evil, for thou art the Saul that I have discarded. Forget me. Only One can save thee from

the horrible decay which will be the end of thy soul. I am Christ's of Nazareth." Chanan is filled with horror and amazement. "Saul and the beggar-Messiah! Thou hast hated Him even more than the money-changers and the priests, because He mars the way." Paul no longer hears him. Chanan raves and persuades, Paul does not heed. He hears a voice. . . . At last he rushes away, saying, in accents full of emotion: "Gamaliel's voice . . . my teacher. . . . Now I know the will of Christ for me." Gamaliel's voice is really heard at this juncture chanting a Psalm, for he is marching with the Galilean pilgrims.

They are carrying the rolls of the Book, and at this juncture the Rabbi Exorcist has entered with his disciples. They and he bow to the earth, covering their faces before the Torah. The Rabbi, when the procession has passed, gives vent to his jealousy by reviling Gamaliel, but Chanan seems to awaken from a trance, saying: "Forget thee? No, Saul, I take thee with me."

The curtain falls.

The third picture has as its background the Rabbinic Academy and western Forum of the Temple area. Before the open hall, furnished with seats in tiers with lectern desks before them, runs a paved alley. Marullus and Aulus Frisius are seen coming along this alley. They are deep in conversation over the many spears and short swords that are missing from the arsenal. Frisius is surprised to find that Marullus is not grieved, but rather pleased, at the theft. He adjures Frisius not to let the matter get abroad, and unfolds to the simple soldier the wily plan to let Judea ruin herself with rebellion which is coming and thus rid Rome of the detested Jews. Turning into the hall of the Academy, Marullus seats himself on one of the benches, saying, "I have a longing to desecrate this place."

Frisius expresses admiration of Gamaliel, but Marullus cannot stand him. "For when you speak with him you feel he is always and truly right; he paralyzes the politician in me, and that is awkward for a Procurator and a future Senator." Frisius: "Why despisest thou this people? Is it not wonderful that in this time of murderers and gluttons there should be a people obsessed by an all-absorbing passion for the Deity?" "Frisius, Frisius," Marullus exclaims, "the old ladies of the Palatine allow themselves to be taken in by Judaism . . . but thou, a brave Teutonic heart! No, no; every Teuton is born a Jew-hater."

As they disappear, the pupils of the Academy come into the hall and take their places, spread out the rolls and begin to recite in low sing-song with swaying bodies. Two young men,

pupils respectively of Rabbis Gamaliel and Zaddok, begin to argue concerning the merits of these two Rabbis. Meanwhile Paul and Barnabas appear in the alley. The latter is remonstrating with Paul for having shocked the brethren and for now endangering his (Paul's) life in this "world of the Rabbis." But Paul insists that he has received a divine mission to Gamaliel. "How can I live in the new world when in the old I have not paid my debt?" Barnabas leaves him and he seats himself in the shade at some distance. The young pupils in the Academy are still conversing, the one seeks to learn of the other the reason for Rabbi Gamaliel's emotion when he is giving some specially fine interpretation of Scripture. The other attributes it to sorrow at the loss of his best-loved and most brilliant pupil, Saul of Tarsus. But the pupil of Rabbi Zaddok is surprised: "Has he lost but one disciple?" And the other assures him that it is the case, continuing: "But perhaps he loves this man more than any of us just because he has lost him."

Two Rabbis appear from the back of the hall. The disciples rise to greet them. Rabbi Gamaliel is tall and powerfully built, with no sign of his age in him; Rabbi Shimon, his son, shows refinement and timidity. With them are two small boys, whom Gamaliel presents to the class bidding it welcome and love them. Gamaliel turns to Rabbi Shimon: "Shimon, my son, when thou didst enter into my chamber today with these souls, the sun's rays trembled on the window. I also trembled. For every child bears the name: *God waits*."

The pupils, meanwhile, are about to clothe the new boys in the student's mantle and furnish them with scrolls, but Gamaliel interrupts, bidding them take holiday instead, for such unawakened souls are a gift. In a pause, it is clear that the old Rabbi is suddenly filled with sad thoughts. "Had I only not awakened *that* child too early," he says at last. They speak of Saul together, and his keen and early perception of truth. This gives an opportunity to one of the pupils to open a discussion in the scribal manner of the day.

"In all of us there is at times far too much perception. That is the origin of all heresy." (*Paul suddenly appears.*)

Paul: Rabban! (*He falls on Gamaliel's neck.*)
Gamaliel: Thou! Thou! My Saul! (*Both weep loudly and long.*)
The Disciples: The man who was lost!
Gamaliel: Pardon me, Shimon, my son! But should not a mother weep, whose little one has risen from the dead?
Paul (*sobbing*): I fell away . . . I fell away. . . .
Gamaliel: But thou hast returned, and that suffices!

At this point three Rabbis enter together, all old men: Rabbi Zaddok—emaciated, with glowing eyes; Rabbi Huna—a careworn legalist; and Rabbi Meir—very mild and benign.

Rabbi Gamaliel greets them joyously with the news of the return of his beloved pupil Saul. But the latter begs him not to rejoice, realizing that Gamaliel has not grasped the import of his coming. "I have said, 'The Law *is* fulfilled, and Love *hath* come,'" says Paul. "Love *will* come," replies Gamaliel. But Paul insists: "Love *was* in our midst. The Law *is* fulfilled—the Promised One *has* appeared to Israel." All press around him excitedly as he continues. . . . "But Israel has *killed* the Messiah." Their horror is complete. Rabbi Zaddok is amazed at the mercy of God who has not destroyed the world at such blasphemy.

The pupils of the Academy at a sign from Rabbi Huna draw near to bind Paul, but are prevented by Gamaliel, who has recovered sufficiently from the shock to realize Paul's danger. Paul is taken away by the pupils, with strict injunctions from Rabbi Gamaliel as to his care. The Rabbis remain to argue the matter. The majority desire to bring Paul before the Sanhedrin. It is a case of the most flagrant blasphemy and in the hearing of the whole school, and so it cannot be allowed to pass without extreme punishment, even death. Gamaliel cries out: "What service have ye done to the soul of that Jesus by causing him to be crucified?" The others are again shocked. Rabbi Gamaliel was away at sea when the Crucifixion took place. Rabbi Huna says: "Who knows but that thou wouldst have acquitted even him?"

Gamaliel (with a long look at Rabbi Huna): Who knows?

Rabbi Huna goes on to point out that this case is extremely serious, for the offender is a teacher of the people, a learned man, whose influence was unlimited. The majority desire Paul's death even more eagerly, until at last Rabbi Meir, who is more in sympathy with the tender feelings of Gamaliel, asserts that it is clear that Saul of Tarsus has every sign of being possessed by an evil spirit, whom he calls "Messiah," and therefore can only be dealt with by an Exorcist. The others are scornful of the "quibble," but the idea moves the majority, however, and eventually carries the day. Rabbi Gamaliel has begged them all along to let him deal with Saul in his own way, and even now, "Again I say, give me this soul."

Rabbi Huna: There must be no pact between Israel and the Crucified One.

Gamaliel (with a long look): Why not?

Great excitement ensues. "Father! Thy word makes the majority," says Rabbi Shimon imploringly.

Gamaliel: Fetch the Exorcist.

P. P. LEVERTOFF.

(To be concluded.)

MISCELLANEA

NOTES AND COMMENTS

PROFESSOR WHITNEY writes to correct an error in the last line of the footnote at the end of his article in our October number (p. 214). Instead of 576 the number 376 should be read.

We have received a copy of *Prayers and Hymns for Use in Schools*, compiled by a committee of the Leicestershire Education Authority, and authorized for use in its schools. The collection shows great liturgical variety; for, in addition to collects and prayers, there are a number of litanies, and also the *Te Deum*, *Sanctus*, *Gloria in Excelsis*, etc. In the hands of good teachers this little compilation should prove of the greatest value in helping the children to worship, both at school and in later life. The hymns, with exceptions, are taken from *Songs of Praise*.

A Review of Life and Work is the title of a very live college magazine which has been sent to us from Australia. It is published by St. John's College, Morpeth, N.S.W., a college which belongs to a number of Australian dioceses and is associated with the Universities both of Sydney and of London. Both its religious and its educational ideals are high; and this terminal magazine points to Catholic principles and wide intellectual interests as inspiring its work. The immediate needs of the college are a chapel, a library, and an endowment fund of £10,000.

The *Catechism of Christian Faith and Practice*, published recently by the S.P.C.K. for the English Church Union, is going far afield. The Assistant Bishop in Corea (Bishop Embling), in acknowledging a copy, writes: "It will please you to hear that it has been translated into Corean and will shortly be in circulation amongst our Christians."

A correspondent writes:

Why is the absurd expression, "try and do," with similar combinations, so firmly established in the popular language? I have never seen any explanation. The Longer Exhortation in the Communion Service, now obsolete, bids the congregation "try and examine themselves." Since the English Version of the Bible has "let a man examine himself," "try" is clearly a Saxon equivalent for the more sonorous word of Latin origin, in accordance with the practice of the sixteenth century exhortations of the Prayer Book. From 1549 till, perhaps, the middle of the nineteenth century a large proportion of the population heard these words read in church from the Book of Common Prayer, a recognized model of good English. Many of the hearers would understand "try" in the familiar sense of "attempt," and would conclude that "try and" was another way of saying "try to."

VERSES

TO THE HOLY CHILD IN THE MADONNA'S ARMS

No doubt in theory, so to speak,
You knew from all eternity
The dress in which our senses clothe
The substance of reality.

Always you knew that fur was soft,
And that a mother's arms are strong,
That children's chatter is as sweet
To the loving ears as any song.

But could you, did you really know
All this except in the abstract,
And am I right to think you now
Are revelling in the concrete fact?

Is that the reason why you gaze
So all-absorbed on something there
That now for the first time you see
Clad in the form we see it wear?

I know not what it is you watch,
A lamb or kitten, flower or bird,
St. Joseph sawing, or St. John
Learning to read the hallowed Word.

But this I know, that if you would
For your new feelings utterance seek,
You need but nestle close and press
A kiss upon your mother's cheek.

For you are one of us and now,
Strange doctrine though it seem, have ways
Forbidden to you as the Son
Of God in pre-incarnate days.

Or am I wrong, and was it you
That always spoke in every kiss,
And made each colour, scent and sound
The medium of your messages;

While we were deaf and blind and hard,
And would not know the love that tries
Through pain and beauty, joy and grief
To make life still a paradise?

And is the mystery this, that you
Made man are nothing new or strange,
But we through knowing you at last
Into diviner beings change?

A. B.

MORS SECUNDA

(i.)

THE following quotations may be added to those given by Dr. Feltoe in THEOLOGY, vol. iv., p. 291 *f*.

1. Mone, *Lateinische Hymnen des Mittelalters*, vol. i., No. 124, lines 21-25:

DE PASSIONE DOMINI. AD GENUA

Quid sum tibi reversurus,
actu vilis, corde durus,
quid rependam amatori,
qui elegit pro me mori
ne dupla morte morerer ?

With the actual phrase used here by St. Bernard (?), compare lines 25 *f*. of Adam of St. Victor's sequence *Sextus passus feria*:

Morte sua simplici
Nostræ morte duplici
Fert medelam;
Vitæ pandit aditum,
Nostrum sanat gemitum
Et querelam. (Gautier, 1894, p. 39.)

2. Mone, *op. cit.*, No. 220:

ORATIO IN ELEVATIONE CORPORIS CHRISTI

Ave sancta caro Christi,
quæ pro nobis doluisti,
dum in cruce pependisti
et nos morte redemisti.
Viva caro, vivax unda,
tu nos salva, tu nos munda,
ne nos trahat mors secunda.

Adam of St. Victor provides a parallel for this also. See the closing lines of *Zyma vetus expurgetur*:

Vive panis, vivax unda,
Vera vitis et fecunda,
Tu nos pasce, tu nos munda,
Ut a morte nos secunda
Tua salvet gratia. (Gautier, p. 49.)

3. Mone, *op. cit.*, No. 221, lines 7 and 8:

ORATIO METRICE COMPOSITA IN ELEVATIONE CORPORIS CHRISTI

O panis vive, confer mihi gaudia vitæ,
salve me, munda, ne dampner morte secunda.
(xv. cent.)

4. Mone, *op. cit.*, No. 295, lines 33 *f.*:

VERSUS DE MORTUIS SUPER RESPONSORIO *Libera me domine*

Beati mortui, qui in domino moriuntur, in his
mors secunda potestatem non habebit,
sed erunt sicut angeli,
cum sint resurrectionis filii. *In die.*

(xiv. cent.)

5. Mone, *op. cit.*, No. 296, line 4:

This is similar to the above, but defective. The MS. is twelfth century. Both this piece and the last are interesting as incorporating the *Lacrymosa*, which later was appended to *Dies iræ*.

Lines 3 and 5 are missing, and line 4 is printed:

ne . . . mors nos absorbeat.

It is certainly tempting to fill in the blank with *secunda*.

Lines 8 *f.* read:

horridus hic calix iræ, quem potavimus;
hæc est mors, quam corpori debemus,
de morte
animæ
suscita nos, deus!

(ii.)

THE WORLD, THE FLESH AND THE DEVIL

Three additional references (THEOLOGY, vols. iv., p. 350; v., p. 234).

1. Adam's sequence *Supernæ matris gaudia*, lines 9-10:

Mundus, caro, dæmonia
Diversa movent prælia. (Gautier, *op. cit.*, p. 226.)

2. Anon. sequence *Ad honorem Trinitatis* (St. Augustine), lines 31-36:

Modestam vitam elegit
Carnem mundumque subegit,
Dæmonem similiter,
E ratione regendo,
Illis tribus resistendo
Pro viribus fortiter.

(Wrangham, *Lit. Poetry of Adam of S. Victor*, vol. iii., p. 216.)

3. Piæ Cantiones (P.M.M.S.'s ed., p. 85, *Homo quidam Rex nobilis*, lines 34-36):

Mundus, caro, dæmonia me male seduxistis,
Dum per diversa vitia me miserum duxistis,
Et Paradisi ostia finaliter clausistis.

MAURICE FROST.

NOTES

THE DECAY OF ANCIENT CIVILIZATION

PROFESSOR ROSTOVTZEFF, the Russian scholar who holds the chair of Ancient History at Yale University, has written what will for a long time be the standard *Social and Economic History of the Roman Empire* (Oxford University Press, 1926). Happy indeed is the possessor of this magnificent volume with its unique gallery of pictures drawn from original sources. No student of Church History can neglect this "background book," which shows the economic preoccupations of the persons whom he is studying. For example, the Decian persecution appears in a new light when one reads the mass of evidence which illustrates the fifty years or so before the reforms of Diocletian. The greater part of the third century was one long reign of terror, during which the panic-stricken authorities struck pitilessly at noble and bourgeois alike, and the masses cowered in hopeless misery. The sufferings of the Christians, real though they were, represented a few drops only in the ocean of human tribulation. Caracalla's massacre of Alexandrian citizens, described in the so-called "Acts of the Heathen Martyrs," must have seemed to an impartial contemporary a far greater thing than the persecutions of the Christians.

So far as Professor Rostovtzeff permits himself to formulate a cause for the decay of the Empire it is this. The first century was a time of steady progress. The second century witnessed a set-back, which need not have proved fatal. The third was for the most part a time of military anarchy and civil war. The army was levied from the despised country-folk, who had never been assimilated by the brilliant urban civilization. The soldiers and the imperial leaders they threw up struck savagely at the hated city folk. Such is the real class-war explanation of this period of history—not the city proletariat revolting against its masters, but the country retaliating on the city.

Apparently the Empire was too big a unit. Its size made the cost of administration too high. A number of small states each maintaining a local militia could have remained at a high level of civilization. But the constant passage of officials and armies, eating up the local resources, made individual enterprise in business and agriculture unremunerative. Neither Diocletian nor Constantine saw any way out. By the fourth century the capitalist class was practically extinct, and the Empire was organized in two main classes, the upper, official, non-productive class and the oppressed people.

The problem is the decay of the Empire at a time when Oriental civilization remained stable or even revived brilliantly. "Why was the city civilization of Greece and Italy unable to assimilate the masses? Why did it remain a civilization of the *élite*? Why was it incapable of creating conditions which should secure for the ancient world a continuous, uninterrupted movement along the same path which our modern world is traversing again?" The question has been answered along four lines: (1) *The political.* The creative forces of city life gradually ceased to function as the world-state absorbed all else. (2) *The economic.* This Rostovtzeff rejects. There is no evidence of impoverishment of the soil; the decay of agriculture is one of the phenomena to be explained, not a cause. (3) *The biological*—the extermination of the best, race-

suicide, etc. But why should the infiltration of Germans and Celts in the West, destined eventually to build up a high civilization, have contaminated the Romans? Once more, this is a description of what happened, not a cause. (4) *The religious.* Christianity has been held responsible. No doubt the change of faith was *accompanied* by a gradual decay of the old civilization, but was it a cause?

Rostovtzeff concludes that each theory contributes something and helps us to see that the main phenomenon was "the gradual absorption of the educated classes by the masses and the consequent simplification of all the functions of political, social, economic, and intellectual life, which we call the barbarization of the ancient world."

"Our civilization will not last unless it be a civilization not of one class, but of the masses. The Oriental civilizations were more stable and lasting than the Græco-Roman, because, being chiefly based on religion, they were nearer to the masses. Another lesson is that violent attempts at levelling have never helped to uplift the masses. They have destroyed the upper classes, and resulted in accelerating the process of barbarization. But the ultimate problem remains like a ghost ever present and unlaid: Is it possible to extend a higher civilization to the lower classes without debasing its standard and diluting its quality to the vanishing-point? Is not every civilization bound to decay as soon as it begins to penetrate the masses?"

W. K. L. C.

THE BROKEN BODY

R. Otto in his book *Zur Erneuerung und Ausgestaltung des Gottesdienstes* (Giessen, 1925) propounds a theory of the meaning of the Eucharistic words which at first sight is attractive (pp. 46-48). There is no resemblance between the breaking of bread and pouring out of wine and the Crucifixion. Contemporaries would no more have seen in them a representation of crucifixion than we should take them as symbolical of hanging. The body was not broken on the Cross, nor was the blood poured out. St. Paul's conception of the Blood was not based on the historic Golgotha but on the idea of a sacrificial victim. Nails were not used in crucifying except to intensify the suffering. Had they been used in the case of Jesus the Synoptists would surely have mentioned the fact. The first allusion to them comes in the Thomas story. So far from blood being shed, death ensued from the impeding of the blood's proper circulation. Even if nails were used, the wounds were quickly covered over by the swelling of the flesh.

Then what did our Lord mean? He was thinking of *stoning,* punishment at the hands of an enraged mob of Jews, such as was Stephen's lot. The mangling of the body by stones is exactly represented by breaking the bread, and blood would pour out as a result of the crushing and wounds. Jesus therefore expected to be stoned for blasphemy.

In favour of the traditional view I suggest the following considerations:

1. The nailing *is* mentioned in St. John, and is not excluded by the Synoptists' account. The fourth Gospel is a good witness for events connected with the Crucifixion.

2. Our Lord's anticipation, when still in Galilee, that He would be handed over to the Gentiles for crucifixion, is very well attested and must not be lightly discarded.

3. This anticipation would be strengthened by the events of Holy Week. Lynch law was unlikely when the popular feeling was favourable to Him—the case of Stephen is no analogy. His foes could hardly have Him stoned for blasphemy when both the people were favourable to Him and the Roman Governor was present with a strong force to keep order at the feast. So that handing Him over to Pilate, charged with an offence which would excite suspicion, was a natural outcome of the condition of affairs.

4. The reference to blood is sufficiently explained, as in St. Paul's case, by the influence of the conception of a sacrificial victim, memories of Isaiah liii., and the associations with the Exodus which accompanied the Last Supper.

It is worth noting that, according to *Sanhedrin* (ed. Danby, pp. 90-92), stoning was followed by crucifixion of the corpse.

W. K. L. C.

SITTING FOR THE PSALMS

A CUSTOM is growing up in many churches of sitting for the psalms. It is not merely old people who are doing it. Moreover, the custom is being defended as reasonable, even desirable. Some believe it to be "more catholic." Others advise it to those who find they can "follow the psalms better," or "get more good" by sitting. What is the history of the custom?

I

There are no directions for it in the Prayer Book. The congregation is told to stand for the *Gloria Patri*, and naturally they would remain standing for the psalms that follow. The *Venite* does not say, "O come, let us worship and sit down." Sitting is inconsistent with the idea of the psalms that were sung in the Temple by those that "by night stand in the house of the Lord" and "lift up their hands in the sanctuary and praise the Lord."

The early Church recognized only two attitudes in worship, standing and kneeling, with their modifications of bowing and prostration. So we read in all standard works of liturgiology, Greek, Roman, and Anglican. Though, naturally, people sit to hear sermons, and for lessons when regarded as read for instruction, and not, as is the Gospel, as an act of praise.

Authorities differ as to the origin of the Divine Office, but certainly one element in its inception must have been the tradition of the Jewish Synagogue service. But the Synagogue service was regarded as an extension of the Temple worship, and so as a sacrificial act of praise, for those who could not actually stand in the gates of Jerusalem. The Therapeutæ, too, mentioned by Philo, sang psalms standing towards the east, and as Eusebius took them to be Christians we gather he was accustomed to see people standing for the psalms in church. Athanasius speaks of the Christian virgin as standing to sing psalms by herself, and Basil declares that his monks stood to sing the psalms all together. Chrysostom adds that those whom he knew in Syria also stretched out their hands, while Augustine, in preaching to an ordinary congregation, reminds them of the psalm they had just stood to sing. Socrates describes how Leontius, the semi-Arian Bishop, when he stood up in choir to sing, mumbled the *Gloria Patri* so that no one could hear whether he used the

orthodox form or not, and Jerome rebukes a deacon for talking to a virgin when he was standing in church to sing. Clearly all sorts and conditions of men stood for the psalms.

There is one exception to the general rule. Cassian, who spent a long time with the monks of Egypt, tells us how an angel settled for them the number of psalms for the morning and evening services by standing and singing twelve to them and then disappearing. So in their services they sat during each psalm and listened, and then stood to pray at the end of each. But the reader stood as the angel had stood, and they all stood up for the *Gloria Patri*, as they also did in Cassian's native Gaul, where apparently they "sang it full."

But the custom of sitting evidently grew. Not at first for the psalms, but for the responsories after the lessons, which were sung by soloists and not by the whole body. Benedict in his Rule says that at Vespers the monks may sit when the psalms are done and the lessons are to be read, but all must stand for the *Gloria Patri* in the responsory. At the psalms they must stand that their minds may be in harmony with their voices. In the Rule of Chrodegang two centuries later, all except the ill and weak are to stand; they are not even to use a stick to lean on. Peter Damianus in the eleventh century tells the canons of Besançon that, if the seraphim as well as courtiers stand, they ought to be able to. In the eleventh century "misereres" began to be set up so that the monks could get support as they stood, while the Consuetudinary of Sarum says that all must stand for the psalms at Vespers and Prime, but that the older ones may, by dispensation, take turns at sitting (without singing) and standing at Matins. Sitting, however, had become the custom by the time of the Council of Basel (1432-49), since those present were ordered to stand for the *Gloria Patri*, and seems to have been formally recognized in the seventeenth century in the Roman Church.

II

In England since the Reformation it has apparently always been the custom to stand "in quires and places where they sing." It is difficult to sing unless you stand, and the cathedrals had a tradition behind them. But it was hard to secure reverence in parish churches. The Puritans' theory of church-going was different, and they disliked the people taking part except, perhaps, in singing metrical psalms. For a hundred years it was all the Church could do to get the congregation to stand for the *Gloria Patri* and to bow at the Holy Name. It was part of the fight against the general irreverence that led people to keep their hats on, or to throw them on the altar if it had been brought down to the nave.

So in 1618 Bishop Buckridge says that it was the custom to stand for the Creed and the Gospel, but to sit for the psalms and the lessons. Prynne complained that at Hereford they stood for the doxologies, and blames Laud for this "disorderly practice." In Kent some people described it as an "antiquated and obsolete ceremony." In London it was regarded as a "pretended innovation," along with the cope and surplice, though it was granted that people might take off their hats for metrical psalms. But things were better elsewhere. Bishop Montague enquires in his articles of 1635 if the people uncover their heads and stand at the Creed, hymns, and doxologies. William Beale, at St. John's, Cambridge, in 1641 turned to the east for the *Gloria Patri*, and must

have been standing to do so. Jeremy Taylor in 1660 mentions standing and turning to the east as an old custom established among church-people, while even Baxter in 1679 allows that many people stand up when the psalms are said or sung.

III

But a better time was coming for the Church, and we find a series of writers carring on the tradition of Hooker and explaining the principles of the Prayer Book now finally accepted. The Bishops at the Savoy Conference had insisted on the right of the people to join in the service, and in 1684 Anthony Sparrow wrote his *Rationale of the Book of Common Prayer*, and says, "When we say or sing the psalms we are wont to stand." It is now the custom of devout persons, as Bishop Wilson declares two years later, a custom "which thousands of good people of our church practise at this day." The learned Joseph Bingham, in his *Antiquities of the Christian Church* (1715-22), speaks very definitely of sitting as "never allowed by the ancients as an ordinary practice of devotion," arguing that Cassian's exception proves the rule. In 1717 people in Holborn are being asked to stand and resent it, though they now acknowledge that to stand for the doxology is an ancient custom. In 1723 another writer, Thomas Bisse, declares that "piety will teach us, or rather make us, rise up with joyful hearts at the rehearsal of the psalms." By the nineteenth century the more reverent custom is fully re-established, and in 1817 John Shepherd shows the influence of Bingham in declaring that "standing has universally been deemed the most proper attitude for praise," while Richard Mant in 1824 stresses the participation of the congregation in the service and quotes Sparrow on standing. His words reappear in Charles Wheatley's book in 1847, when the full influence of the Tractarian revival was being felt, and he adds that it would be "very indecent" to sit when we repeat parts that are directed to God"; while Thomas Lathbury, to whose *History of the Book of Common Prayer*, published in 1858, I owe much of what is written above, sees clearly how this custom of sitting was bound up with Puritan ideas, and adds, "Such a custom at the present day would be deemed most irreverent," though at one time it was common.

CLEMENT F. ROGERS.

COMMUNION IN ONE KIND

1. AN American diocese was recently served with a notice from the health authority calling upon it to discontinue the administration of the Cup. Churches were closed in Australian cities during the influenza epidemic of 1919 by the authorities. Similar action is conceivable in any English-speaking country. The prejudice against the common Cup felt by some people is notorious.

2. Prohibition makes difficulties which are felt most acutely by Anglicans.

3. Lambeth Conference Reports testify to the practical difficulties experienced in Central Africa and other countries where wine is not a product of the country and has to be imported at a considerable cost.

4. A South African Bishop, asked the other day why separate Churches for different races are required for Anglicans but not for Roman Catholics, gave the common Cup as one reason.

5. *The Tablet* at the end of 1925 reported with pleasure a Communion at Brussels in both kinds, in which 2,500 persons took part.

REVIEWS

CONSCIENCE AND ITS PROBLEMS: AN INTRODUCTION TO CASUISTRY. By Kenneth E. Kirk. Longmans, 1927. 16s.

This is the third of a series of works which Dr. Kirk has written on moral theology. In the first of these, entitled *Some Principles of Moral Theology*, the author put forward "a tentative scheme for the development and teaching of moral theology in the Church of England"—a scheme based upon the principles of Aquinas and their adaptation to Anglicanism by Sanderson and Jeremy Taylor. A later book, *Ignorance, Faith and Conformity*, defended the continuity of the Anglican development with "the fundamental principles of the moral theology and canon law of the past." It is remarkable for its extension of the doctrine of invincible ignorance. The present book "addresses itself at once to the problems of law, conscience and casuistry." It might have been more logical, the author admits, "to have started the detailed approach to moral theology by a discussion of the purpose of life"—that is, of ultimate moral principles or values. "But," he says, "about the main principles of Christian conduct, as applicable to a civilization like our own, there is little controversy. Difficulties only begin with the discussion of the subordinate precepts dependent upon these main principles." The author's statement of these principles and precepts depends mainly upon ecclesiastical tradition—the teaching of recognized doctors of the Church. The book is intended for Christians—indeed for members of the Anglican communion—and it is much concerned with that equilibrium of the principles of authority and liberty at which the Church of England may be said to aim. Further, the author thinks that the time is not yet ripe for a complete system of casuistry from his point of view. He is concerned that his method should be sound, and the "cases of conscience" which he discusses, although important in themselves, are illustrations of method and do not pretend to be exhaustive. His own work is described as simply "prolegomena" to the future science.

These limitations should be borne in mind in considering the detail of the book. It is divided into two parts. Part I., on "Conscience and Character," has chapters on Conscience, Loyalty, Casuistry, and Casuistry and Christianity; Part II. has chapters on Error, Doubt, and Perplexity: the first of these chapters dealing mainly with ecclesiastical discipline and liberty; the second containing sections on probabilism, the

papal claims, birth-control, betting, and other topics; the third dealing, *inter alia*, with lies, general strikes, compromise, and commercial honesty. There are also some valuable additional notes at the end of the volume.

A book should be judged by the way in which the author has performed the task which he set himself. And I may say at once that it would be difficult to speak too highly of the author's learning or of the candour with which each disputable question is discussed; in subtlety also he can hold his own with the most distinguished of his predecessors among the casuists; and both moral insight and practical good sense are conspicuous throughout the work. Dr. Kirk, however, as he indicates in one place, is more anxious for criticism than for compliments; and it will not appear ungracious, I hope, if the space at my disposal is devoted to some comments, mostly of a general kind, on the limits which he has set to his enquiry and on their bearing on his results.

Doubts and perplexities as to what one ought to do are familiar experiences, and casuistry seeks to resolve them. How should it set about the task? It may appeal to "general principles" of morality, or to "particular precepts." Dr. Kirk thinks that there can be little doubt about the former. I gather that they will include such moral laws as those enjoining veracity, promise-keeping, justice, mercy, beneficence. The most common traditional cases of conscience concern the application of these laws. Am I, for example, to tell the truth to the murderer in full cry after his victim? A few of the more rigid moralists might say that this is my duty. But, as Dr. Kirk remarks, "unswerving rigidity in morality is bound to shipwreck upon the rocks of common sense"; and most moralists would think it right to save an innocent life at the expense of a lie. If they are right, the general principle of veracity is not quite universal. Again, ought I to tell the truth to any questioner although I have promised to keep the secret? Here the rigid moralist is in a fix, because he must break either the law of veracity or that of promise-keeping. The general principles, therefore, are not ultimate; and, if they may not be set aside at will (which no moralist or decent man would allow), then we must investigate the grounds which both give them validity and mark their limits. The utilitarians have done this in their own way and have thus reached a principle which gives guidance in the application of what are really only "middle axioms" to the particulars of conduct. And, although their hedonistic interpretation of this principle may be rejected, they have at least suggested a method for the solution of casuistical questions. We must refer to the ultimate ground of goodness or of value.

I cannot but think, therefore, that, in declining to enter upon an enquiry of this kind, Dr. Kirk leaves the science of casuistry hanging in the air between the ultimate good or "purpose of life," which remains undefined, and the difficulties of conduct in which guidance is needed.

If the ultimate moral standard is not formulated, and if the proximate standards are liable to variation and exception, how are we to determine the value of particulars, especially in difficult cases? If we are concerned about such things, we shall be apt to stick rather closely to our authorities, forgetful that they were men like ourselves and liable to err. Of course an infallible organization or person could get us out of our difficulties with a word. But Dr. Kirk, though he claims much for the Church, does not claim infallibility for its councils or its doctors. He has, indeed, a very careful and candid discussion on the respective claims of loyalty and liberty; and yet the issue of the discussion seems to me to leave many points in doubt as to both faith and morals. The Church of England may soon, if it has not yet, have an organization capable of expressing its mind with authority over its members. It will presumably have "both the right and duty of revising her code"; and such revision "can legitimately extend itself to the consideration of all except the so-called 'first principles' of law whose amendment or abrogation appears to be inconceivable." I am unable to name these "so-called 'first principles,'" and would have welcomed a more precise statement of the limits to the Church's right in this respect. The Church as an organization has a standard set for it which it must follow in order to give moral and religious validity to its revision of the code. Here again the individual and the organization may come into conflict. And, although the issue may not be quite clear, Dr. Kirk is not at all unfair to the individual. He recognizes that, in the long run, it is to the individual that amendment is commonly due: "The issue may be expressed either in canonical enactment or in unofficial custom; but, whichever form it take, it will still be brought about by the voice of individual consciences demanding the abandonment of old principles, or the recognition of new, with a consensus which ultimately proves universal." But, before this consensus has been reached, the conscience of one or a few may stand alone and make its influence felt only slowly. It will at first be frowned upon by the organization which ultimately endorses it. When, we must ask, should the individual bow to authority, and when should he take his own way in spite of the frown or prohibition of the organization? Dr. Kirk says that he should oppose authority only when quite clear in his own conscience that to do so is his duty. So far

the answer holds. But again the question must be pressed, how is he to clarify his conscience? Can he do so otherwise than by an appeal to a standard? Casuistry gets lost in details unless there is an ultimate good or ultimate principle to which it can appeal.

One further point should be mentioned, though it cannot be fully discussed. Dr. Kirk would like to see the Confessional more largely developed in the Church, and for this reason sees the need of special training for the confessors. He has their interests in view, and to my mind this leads to a certain difficulty in following him. In dealing with some cases he is seeking directly for an ethical decision; in dealing with others he seems to be asking only how the confessor should deal with his penitent—but does not resolve the ethical difficulty, although there seems to me to be a genuine ethical problem. It has also struck me that Dr. Kirk does not lay it down as a primary duty of the confessor, confronted with an enquirer who is seeking advice, to induce his penitent to take all steps in his power to enlighten his own conscience in the matter instead of quieting it by an appeal to the "authority" of a priest. I have no reason to suppose that Dr. Kirk underrates the moral value of training the conscience in independent judgment. But does not the Confessional often tend to obscure this value?

W. R. SORLEY.

THE PAINTED GLASS OF YORK. An account of the Medieval Glass of the Minster and the Parish Churches. By F. Harrison, M.A., F.S.A. S.P.C.K. 12s. 6d.

York is fortunate in the possession of more old painted glass than any other English city, and in the care and intelligence which has been lavished on the preservation and elucidation of it. Torre and Gent in the eighteenth century, Purey Cust and Browne and Fowler in the nineteenth, Benson, Lethaby, Knowles, Shaw, and now Mr. Harrison, in the twentieth, are leading names in the list of writers on this fascinating subject. And under more than one Dean—notably Dean Foxley Norris—the all-essential work of resetting and securing the actual glass has been undertaken, first for a window here and there, now for the whole immense area which the Minster contains. Those who, like myself, have seen something of the methods that are being employed, are warmly desirous to bear witness to the faithfulness and skill which have already brought a large proportion of the ancient treasure into a condition which should ensure its safety for many generations to come.

But here we have a volume which offers us a census of all

the old glass in York—Minster, city churches, and Museum. It is written by one who has long been assisting in the work on the Minster glass, and has in previous smaller publications done much to provide the ordinary visitor with the means of understanding the puzzles which ancient windows inevitably offer to the inexperienced eye.

Mr. Harrison's present volume is not the first of its kind. In 1915 Mr. George Benson published (as a Report of the Yorkshire Philosophical Society) a similar survey, pretty copiously illustrated, which I personally have found most useful. It is, however, not easy to procure, and it is in form much more condensed than the book now before me.

Mr. Harrison's is a most excellent and welcome work: very readable, and bearing witness on every page to the diligence and enthusiasm of its author. He says little on the technical side—and rightly refers his reader to Mr. Le Couteur's volume in this same series. His theme is the subjects of the windows, and armed with this book the visitor can make sense of each of the 109 windows in the Minster where sense is in any degree to be discovered. He seems to have made adequate use of all the documentary material that was relevant, particularly of Torre's manuscript in the Chapter Library: as to which one cannot but join in his pious wish that it should be printed *in extenso*.

Not all the riddles which must present themselves in such a medley have been solved. In the yet unrepaired Chapter House windows are many points which seem doubtful—which are demonstrably questionable. Other eyes in time to come perusing these will hit upon solutions. One puzzle which really ought to be within the wit of man to unravel is to be found in the late panels in the north choir aisle (p. 71), which belong to a story more of which is told in the church of St. Michael-le-Belfrey (p. 147).

There are also historical puzzles. No one knows whence the fine Jesse tree in the south choir aisle came, nor the Te Deum window in the south transept. As to this last, I submit the question whether it may not be the east window of St. Martin's, Coney Street. Gent says of that window that it illustrated the life of St. Athanasius and the Athanasian Creed, and was removed to the Minster in 1722. It is out of the question that the subject of the window can have been what he says. Nobody could illustrate the Athanasian Creed, and no medieval person ever tried it. But clauses from the Te Deum, carelessly read, might well suggest fragments of a Creed; and pictures of Ambrose and Augustine composing the hymn would be good enough for Mr. Gent, once he was started on the Athanasian theory.

The great east window receives some elucidation. Mr. Harrison has unearthed in the Chapter Library a series of drawings of each panel, made by one of the Camidge family, and these have enabled the misplacements of the Apocalypse pictures (some of which may be original errors) to be clearly made out.

The lowest one, of kings and prelates, still calls for adjustment. Surely King Ebrauc, with his pagan flamens, must have *begun* the series, which seems designed to show the progress of Christianity in the land; yet he now stands on the extreme right, at the end.

But not the whole of our notice must be confined to the Minster glass. That of the churches, fifteen of them, and the museum occupies nearly half the volume. All Saints', North Street, is the best known of these, from Mr. Shaw's volume, and on the whole has the most remarkable work. But half a dozen others are by no means to be despised. St. Michael's, Spurrier Gate, was rich in heavenly hierarchies, and contains some really admirable heads. St. Martin's, Holy Trinity, St. John's, St. Denys', all have their excellences. I venture to make a suggestion about the two early medallions at St. Denys' (p. 160): I had no doubt in my own mind when I saw them first that they relate to the legend of Theophilus, who sold his soul to the devil. One of the medallions I feel sure represents the bargain; the other seems to be Theophilus in his penitence kneeling before the Virgin.

This notice has probably outrun its due limits. Let me end it with another word of thanks to Mr. Harrison, and a prayer to the Dean and Chapter to bring down the twelfth-century figure of a king from the nave clearstory to a place where it can be seen.

M. R. James.

PRAYER BOOK DISCUSSIONS AND ISSUES

It is impossible to keep pace with the output of literature on the new Prayer Book, and we must content ourselves here with a few words on some of the more representative books and pamphlets which have reached us. A good general introduction to the subject is provided by *The New Prayer Book* (Allen and Unwin, 2s. 6d. net), edited by Dr. Relton and prefaced by a Foreword by the Archbishop of Canterbury. It consists of eight lectures delivered at King's College, London, and illustrates very well the different angles from which the new Book finds support. Like most books on the subject, it contains some personal judgments which strike one as ephemeral: we can hardly imagine, for instance, that in a generation's time

Churchpeople generally will endorse the opinion that the 1927 Preface is a "quite excellent piece of work." One of the most interesting contributions to the volume is Dr. Relton's own lecture entitled "An Anglican Armistice." Summing up the character of the English Church as "Catholic and Reformed," he thinks that the line of demarcation between the English and Roman Churches is to be found neither in rites and ceremonies nor in doctrine, but in the sphere of jurisdiction. We think he is substantially right, but we wish that he had indicated his meaning in greater detail. "We refuse to accept the findings of the Vatican Decree," he says. True; and behind our refusal lies a conception of the Church's authority which is different from Rome's. But when he goes on to add that "we are not prepared to concede a primacy as pertaining *divina providentia* to the Holy See," he is closing the door upon the most hopeful avenue now being explored towards Catholic reunion.

The Bishop of Winchester's *The Prayer Book Revised* (Longmans, 4s. 6d. net) provides a review and interpretation of the new proposals intended to help the layman no less than the priest. It is written throughout in that large, generous, and pastoral spirit which marks all the Bishop's writings, while at the same time rich in detail, amply documented, and always to the point. It exhibits close contact with all that is best in current theological thought, and is therefore of much more than transient interest. We do not doubt that, if this spirit and atmosphere prevail in the counsels of the Church during the next few years, the present crisis will be in a fair way to liquidation.

We turn now to pamphlets and particulars. From the Anglo-Catholic side Fr. Wilfred Knox, Mr. Chalmer Bell, and others of a group of priests opposed to the new Book attack it on a number of lines, constitutional, liturgical, and ecclesiastical. The constitutional objections seem to us such as would only be thought of by anyone who was already opposed to the Book on other grounds, and to be without weight. It is true that the measure underwent much modification at the last moment; but it is understood that this was due to the advice of Parliamentary draftsmen, whose business it is to see that the law does not lay down contradictory provisions on the same subject. The ecclesiastical objections can only be answered by experience; we shall say more on that score directly. On the liturgical side, the objections to the new Canon have been frequently voiced in this journal during the last few years; but the time for them is now past. It is absurd to say that a type of Canon which is used in many other parts of the Anglican

Communion cannot also be used in England; and we have got to adapt ourselves to it as best we may. At the very least it represents a great improvement on the old. We believe, moreover, that Bishop Knox and his friends are right when they urge that the new liturgy is more easily patient of a Catholic interpretation than the old.

We should do Bishop Knox small justice, however, if we dismissed his own position in a sentence. We have before us two pamphlets of his, the one dealing with the problem of order in the Church (*Will the Deposited Book Restore Order in the Church?* The Church Book Room, 3d.) and the other a reply to the Bishop of Middleton entitled *The Unscriptural Character of the Alternative Consecration Prayer* (Longmans, 6d.). We will take the second first. Bishop Knox writes here as the Christian scholar, and none can fail to be impressed with his learning, courtesy, and moderation. Where we disagree with the Bishop is in his interpretation of the Last Supper; and we would ask him to believe that those of us who support the place of the *anamnesis* and the oblation in the new Canon do so because we believe that they serve to bring out more fully the true and scriptural meaning of that sacred scene. The point does not turn on the different meanings of *ἀνάμνησις* or *μνημόσυνον* in Greek, but rather on the meaning of "Do this" in the record of the institution. As distinct both from those who would interpret these words as equivalent to "offer this sacrifice" and from Bishop Knox who would apparently interpret them as a command merely to "administer the bread and the wine," we believe (as Professor Walter Lock urged in THEOLOGY some time ago) that they mean quite simply "celebrate this service." The reference, that is to say, was to the whole rite. But of what kind was the service? It was emphatically a sacrificial and eucharistic service centred in thanksgivings and prayers to God. Dr. Oesterley, from whose *Jewish Background of the Christian Liturgy* Bishop Knox quotes, has brought this out as clearly as anyone; and the point is also made in Professor Emery Barnes' lecture, *The Last Supper and the Lord's Supper* (Bowes and Bowes, 1s. net).* On this ground we maintain that the whole eucharistic action is God-ward as well as man-ward; and it is this which the new Canon serves to represent.

To Dr. Knox's criticism of the Epiclesis as (in the narrowest sense) unscriptural we believe that there is no adequate answer: we should have preferred, as we gather he would, such an

* This is naturally a scholarly little treatise. But surely a Cambridge Professor need not tease his readers by sudden irruptions of solecistic spelling—*e.g.*, beleeve, receeve, woud, shoud. O shade of Dr. Skeat!

allusion to the work of the Holy Spirit as we have in the 1549 rite. At the same time we cannot carry this to a point of conscience. The Epiclesis seems to us not incongruous with what Scripture reveals of the operation of the Holy Ghost in the Church; and its place in the Prayer has considerable authority in the Church of the first six centuries. We have before us as we write, however, the beautiful edition of the South African liturgy recently published by the S.P.C.K. (*The Holy Communion*, Province of South Africa, 4s. net); and we cannot help wondering whether the Canon therein contained might not have proved a better solution of our English problem than that in the Deposited Book.

Dr. Knox's other pamphlet, *Will the Deposited Book Restore Order in the Church?* is of a different kind from the one just considered. The real issue here is whether or not Dr. Knox is right in his claim that the ordinary Catholic way of celebrating the Eucharist, as found now in thousands of English churches, is disorderly. We believe that to be emphatically not the case. There are degrees, of course, of less and more: and we do not doubt that the English character will always call for a certain restraint and soberness in ceremonial as compared with what is found on the Continent. But surely Bishop Knox must realize, if he will contrast (let us say) the services in Westminster Abbey today with what they were in Dean Stanley's time, that there has been an enormous increase in the demand for symbolism in worship. When to that is added the force of a living theology and a strong devotional life—and Bishop Knox, however much he disagrees, would not, we think, deny that the Catholic movement has both—then it must surely be manifest that the Catholic tradition has as good a claim as any other to express itself in ceremony.

Bishop Knox's question is none the less a genuine one, though it derives its main importance from facts and forces which he does not in this pamphlet consider. The attempt to answer it takes us back far beyond rites and ceremonies, and even beyond doctrine, to something greater than either—namely, that "charity which is the bond of peace and all virtues." It is upon that more than upon anything else that the issue depends; and in all quarters of the Church this Christmas we cannot do better than make that greatest of all gifts our special intention at the Eucharist.

E. G. SELWYN.

NOTICES

PROPHETS, PRIESTS, AND PATRIARCHS. Sketches of the Sects of Palestine and Syria. By H. C. Luke. Faith Press. 6s.

Few books of travel can give greater pleasure to the reader than this last work from the ready pen of Mr. Luke. The book is a storehouse of information and full of historical facts which the writer has marshalled in a most interesting way. The first three chapters will be a valuable guide to the modern pilgrim to Jerusalem. Commander Luke, as Assistant Governor of Jerusalem, had unique opportunities of gathering information on a variety of subjects, which he has now made accessible to his readers. The writer finds the human interest of Jerusalem a stimulating experience; there are other interests there too—religious, archæological, and architectural—but the human interest is paramount. It may well be so. You can't be dull when within a small area there are twenty-five denominations and forty mother-tongues, spoken by a population of three-quarters of a million, and all represented in the capital city of the country.

The account of "The Samaritans and their Passover" will be welcomed by those who have not access to larger works. Here we are told of the oldest and smallest sect in the world. In a few houses in Nablûs, grouped round a little synagogue, live one hundred and forty-five people, all that is left of a once numerous and powerful race, whose history goes back to the days of the Babylonian Captivity. They assert that they are of the tribe of Joseph and that they still follow the Law as Moses delivered it on Mount Sinai. They exist to perpetuate two objects: (*a*) the existence of their slender race, and (*b*) to maintain the worship of Mount Gerizim. Here is a deeply interesting survival of the ancient Levitical Law, and it is strange to read that in our day there is still one blood sacrifice offered to Jehovah.

It is no easy matter in a few pages to give the history of the various Mohammedan sects, yet we have a clear and exact account of this in the chapter "Islam in Palestine and Syria." Mohammed founded a monarchy in which the spiritual and temporal authority were concentrated in the hands of one person, the Khalif; but he made the great mistake of failing to designate his successor, which was the cause of angry disputes after his death. The succession to the Khalifate became the rock on which Islam split into its two principal divisions of Sunni and Shiah, which divide the Moslem world today.

The account of "The Old Man of the Mountains" is a thrilling story. By this title Hasan Sabah was known to the chroniclers of the Crusades; he was by instinct and temperament a revolutionary. At his stronghold at Alamut in the mountains of Rudbar he trained his body of *fedai*, who were ready to carry out his commands and remove any person who thwarted his plans. By means of a decoction of hashish he roused his followers' spirits and sent them to stab his enemies. This body came to be known to Arabic-speaking people as *hashishi*, "the hemp-taker." From the plural of this word, *hashishîn*, the name of the Order of Assassins has passed into many languages of Europe. The Grand Master of the Assassins was known as Sheikh al-Jebal. And as the primary meaning of *Sheikh* is "old man," it was this version which was adopted in the West and gave to Hasan and his successors the picturesque title of "Old Man

of the Mountains." The book contains a valuable plan of the Holy Sepulchre, and there are many photographs, some of them quite unique. The writer is an enthusiastic student of Eastern life, and we look forward to receiving a further supply from his storehouse of treasures.

F. N. HEAZELL.

THE CALL OF THE BLESSED SACRAMENT. By the Rev. A. C. Buchanan, B.D. Allen and Unwin. 3s. 6d.

There is something very simple and something very happy about these devotional addresses, which have the air of an "apologia" about them. Brought up in the Presbyterian fold, the author eventually, after serving as a minister for some years, was ordained Priest in the Scottish Episcopal Church; in this little book we have his experiences as a Presbyterian, and later the fulness of his heart as a Priest. The accounts of the "holding" of the Communion Service in the Presbyterian Church are really most interesting.

The simple happiness of the book is what first strikes us, as Dr. Buchanan looks backward, upward, inward, and forward through the mystery of the Holy Communion. There is also a note of intense optimism, which is pleasing. On the other hand, we finished reading the addresses with the feeling of a lack of backbone and vigorous incentive "to do justly, to love mercy, and to walk humbly" with God. There is the danger of considering all as done for us, and we discern throughout the tendency to think that before the words of institution in the Consecration Prayer Jesus is not present (pp. 32, 73, 97). The author tells us he enjoys the blessings of "orthodox, sympathetic, and accessible bishops, our very full and well-ordered Canon of the Mass, our liberty to reserve the Blessed Sacrament, our freedom to use 'Devotions.'"

E. C. PRICHARD.

RELIGIO LAICI. Essays on Religious, Social, and Philosophical Subjects. By Sir Henry Slesser, K.C., M.P. Mowbray. 4s. 6d.

It is not always easy in a book of essays to find the key to the philosophy of life followed by the author; very often there is no single mind traceable. But that is far from true here. It is easy to find in this little book certain points of view which are the most characteristic of Sir Henry Slesser. Putting it very simply, the book maintains that the social and economic philosophy of the Middle Ages, particularly of St. Thomas Aquinas, was far nearer the true Christian teaching than anything today; that mediæval ideals were those of the Good, the Beautiful, the True, taught by a Church infallible, crystallized in the Mass, and guarded by the twin forces of Pope and Emperor; and that the "jungle politics and economics" of today can only be eradicated by bold dogmatic teaching of the fundamental truths of the Incarnation and the Mass.

There is much of interest here, not least that a member of the Labour Party so deliberately takes his stand on Aquinas and the ideals of the Middle Ages. We doubt whether the mediæval ideals and practice in the matter of property were as Christian as Sir Henry thinks, for we remember a great many unchristian sides of feudalism. Again, we cannot follow the argument on page 25. Here it is asserted that the Catholic Church, as such, is infallible; any mistakes or betrayals that mar the Church's history are due to the *sinfulness* of the Church, and in no way lessen its infallibility. We would quote Dr. Swete's words: "The Spirit of truth does not communicate all the truth at once, nor does He under-

take to guard the Church from error during the process of attaining it. It is His to lead, but the Church is responsible for following her Guide."

But the book is stimulating, sometimes irritating, both of which characteristics may enhance its value. One sentence we quote with which we entirely agree: "We believe that all those who would proceed to alter the world, whether by Socialism, Collectivism . . . or any other plan which does not base itself upon a change in the heart of man, must fail" (p. 51).

E. C. PRICHARD.

THE FIRST CHRISTIANS OF BRITAIN. By J. Charles Wall. Talbot. 8s. 6d.

This is a book of notes on the history of the Celtic Church, with special attention to the question of the origins of British Christianity. It is full of interest and contains a good deal of out-of-the-way information. In the matter of the sources of the Church in this country, no tradition is too obscure or improbable to receive painstaking and respectful attention. The author is even ready to discuss the possibility of a visit from St. Peter and from St. James the son of Zebedee. The book as a whole gives a vivid impression of the early Celtic Saints, of their heroism, their travels by land and still more marvellously by sea, of their zeal for writing and their love of books, of their missionary enthusiasm, of their asceticism; also it must be confessed of their resentments, and of a certain strong infusion of pagan characteristics. The author tells an extraordinary story—can it really be true?—of St. Columba conniving at something very like human sacrifice. So strong was the feeling that a new church or monastery must have relics that, in default of them, the saint actually allowed someone, at his own request certainly, to be buried alive at the foundation of the monastery of Iona! The story of St. Patrick sacrificing one of his own teeth, and of another St. Columba giving a finger for the same purpose, pale before this appalling tradition. Mr. Wall's enthusiasm for the Celts does seem in one place to lead him to make claims for the British Church which are difficult to substantiate. He states that "they carried the Word to the Angles and the Saxons through perils from which the Augustinian bishops fled." But surely it was only too true that the British Church did consistently refuse to have anything to do with the evangelization of the Anglo-Saxons. St. Aidan and the monks of the North had no connection with the British bishops who fell out with St. Augustine. The volume is plentifully illustrated and is cheap at 8s. 6d.

K. D. MACKENZIE.

THE SACRAMENTARY (LIBER SACRAMENTORUM). Historical and Liturgical Notes on the Roman Missal. By Ildefonso Schuster. Translated from the Italian by Arthur Levelis-Marke. Vol. III. (Parts 5 and 6). Burns Oates and Washbourne. 15s.

This is the third of the large volumes which the Abbot of the Monastery of St. Paul's Without the Walls modestly refers to as "hasty notes." The bulk of it is occupied with a continuation of the analysis of the Proper of the Mass, parts of which are to be found in each volume. But far more important and more interesting are the "introductions," which are somewhat arbitrarily prefixed to each of the parts into which the whole work is divided. The two chapters of the Introduction to Part V. are (1) Eastern Influence in the Roman Liturgy; (2) The Place of Monasticism in the Liturgical Life of Rome. In the former the author gives an impressive list of the Popes who were of Oriental blood and of the many Eastern

sanctuaries in Rome itself. He points out that Eastern shrines were imitated in Rome and that the dramatic character assumed by the Liturgy at the holy places in Palestine was reproduced at the corresponding Roman sanctuaries. Rome itself, and in consequence the Roman Liturgy, is cosmopolitan rather than merely local. In the second chapter the Abbot gives detailed information of the immense number of religious foundations in ancient Rome and of the part which they played in the daily life of the city. The great work of Benedictine monasticism was to perfect liturgical worship. Stability is the mark of the Monks as mobility is that of the Friars. It was the presence then of these great and permanent homes of worship which helped to make Rome the natural centre of all liturgical advance. The Introduction to Part VI. falls likewise into two chapters. The first traces the process by which the cult of the saints gradually lost its earlier character as a local and funereal celebration in the place which happened to contain the relics of a martyr, and developed into a chain of world-wide festivals occupying almost every day in the year. The second draws attention to the danger which this has involved of choking the cycle of the liturgical year with an overgrowth of saints' days. We notice the significant remark that the work of Pius X. in restoring the outline of the *Proprium de Tempore* is only a beginning. The Abbot comments with some severity on the enfeebled piety of the "elegant little books of devotion, whose exaggerated style, full of sighings and constant interruptions by dots and dashes, is founded entirely on sentimentalism," and he will not tolerate the view that the ideal of Catholic devotion is to pray privately while the priest recites the Mass in a low voice.

K. D. MACKENZIE.

THE OLD TESTAMENT AND MODERN PROBLEMS IN PSYCHOLOGY. By J. W. Povah, B.D. Longmans, Green and Co., Ltd. 3s. and 5s.

The author is the General Secretary of the Church Tutorial Classes Association. Incidentally he approaches the problem of the decline of public worship, and suggests that one of the causes may be a reassuring presentation of the Gospel, which fails to challenge thought and conviction. He attaches great importance to the study of Hebrew spiritual experience in order to balance Latin discipline and Greek philosophy in the interpretation of Christianity. An example of his treatment of early Hebrew stories is as follows: Moses' "rod-serpent" is a "libido-symbol." The "rod" was the divinely inspired sense of his energy and capacity for authority. He fled from the recognition of this. The "rod" became a "serpent," a "grovelling and horrible libido." He overcame his moral cowardice, grasped the "serpent," which became again a "rod," the energy of command which accomplished his task. The author is less speculative when he deals with the main theme of his book, the development of Hebrew prophecy, and shows that, in the early history of the nation, men had not sufficient spiritual experience to discriminate between the genuine inspiration of God and "mere outbursts of the subconscious mind," and that, as long as psychical abnormality was regarded as the hall-mark of inspiration, religion and magic could not be distinguished from one another in Israel. The great prophets of later times substituted the moral for the magical test of genuine divine revelation.

A valuable and stimulating book, to be read in the same spirit of independent judgment as that in which it is written.

H. LOVELL CLARKE.

BOOK NOTES

A Commentary on the Psalms. By Rev. T. E. Bird, D.D., Professor of Sacred Scripture, Oscott College, Birmingham. Burns Oates and Washbourne. 2 volumes. 25s. No book could be more useful to those whose duty or practice it is to recite the Psalter regularly. The notes on each psalm are just the right length for those who wish to have all the information which is necessary for intelligent devotion. There is nothing turgid or sentimental, and on the other hand no parade of scholarship. The author is fighting all through for the traditional authorship and application of the Psalms, and Anglican readers will probably have an uneasy feeling that in these matters their own best scholars are on the other side. But it is good for all of us, especially for those who have to take their scholarship at second hand, to realize that tradition is not bankrupt. Perhaps, however, we may be less impressed than the author would wish by the answers of the Biblical Commission to some of the enquiries which seem to have been of the nature of "leading questions." Apart from controversial matter, the seven chapters of prolegomena convey an immense amount of information in a concise and scholarly form.

Jesus and his Bible. By G. H. Gilbert, D.D. Macmillan. This book is a rather impressive argument for the view that our Lord never considered Himself as fulfilling the Old Testament prophecies in detail, and that the whole conception of the Gospel history as the fulfilment of Messianic prophecy is a tragic mistake, the stages of which can be traced in the later books of the New Testament. Dr. Gilbert finds the apostolic interpretation of the Old Testament vitiated by puerile literalism on the one hand, and fanciful allegorism on the other. Many of his points are beyond cavil, but he seems to overpress them. "The unique material of Luke" has surely a far higher value, in the judgment of modern scholars, than he assigns to it, and if this is so, his conclusions must be seriously modified. But he certainly succeeds in administering a cold douche to "eschatology."

Gnostic Scriptures Interpreted. By G. A. Gaskell, M.A. The C.W. Daniel Co. 10s. 6d. Mr. Gaskell, on the other hand, cannot have enough of mystical meanings and allegorical interpretations. *All* scripture, Christian, Gnostic, Egyptian, Babylonian, is inspired, and *it all means the same thing.* There is no literal truth to be found in them anywhere, but, while superficially all alike are full of contradictions and absurdities, they respond to "a common symbology of ideas." This is a method of interpretation which it is obviously easier to apply to the Gnostic scriptures than to the New Testament, but Mr. Gaskell finds the Fourth Evangelist among the Gnostics. As an illustration of his eagerness we may take St. John i. 6, which is thus paraphrased: "There was emanated into the lower mind a mental quality of Divine origin, whose specific nature was the moral nature." It is difficult to think of this kind of book as anything but an ingenious curiosity.

Christianity as Life. By Edward Grubb, M.A. Swarthmore Press. 7s. 6d. This is the first volume of a series entitled *The Nature of Christianity*, a series which promises to be of very great value. Mr. Grubb writes with knowledge, and adds to knowledge the temperance and charity which we expect from the Society of Friends. It is not to be expected that he

should reach the conclusions of Catholic Christianity in all respects: indeed, he criticizes Catholicism with some severity: but though he spurns our scaling-ladders he is a freeman of our Sion. The main thesis of the book is that Christianity is not a body of truth or a system of Church order, but an experience of God. It is perhaps only natural that he seems to dispose very lightly indeed of the evidence for our Lord's institution of the "Sacraments of the Gospel"; but it is less excusable that he should represent the Fourth Gospel as simply identifying the Spirit with the living Christ. Surely the truth is that He is both identified and distinguished. But that seems to imply the doctrine (the "notion" as a Friend would say) of the Holy and Undivided Trinity. It will be evident that the book contains negations which remove it far from orthodoxy; but on the positive side Mr. Grubb's exposition is of very high value indeed, and the tone and temper of it all is beyond praise. K. D. M.

Champions of Peace. By Hebe Spaull. George Allen and Unwin. 3s. 6d. A pleasantly written series of slight biographies of outstanding modern champions of peace, it lacks the use of the critical faculty. There is no evidence, for instance, in the chapter dealing with President Wilson, that the authoress has read the letters of Mr. W. H. Page or Colonel House's book. The characters delineated are President Wilson, General Smuts, Viscount Cecil, Inazo Nitobe, Nansen, Branting, Benes, Ramsay Macdonald. There is throughout no hint of any failure or weakness of character. Outstanding men are better served by more balanced biography.

History of the People of England. From the earliest times to 1066. (*The Bede Histories*, Series II., vol. i.) By Adeline I. Russell, M.A. Sheldon Press. 2s. 6d. A school textbook, subject to the limitations of such a work, but of excellent quality. The historical textbook of a past generation took little notice of all those vast periods before human life emerged on to the stage of history; it dealt unsatisfactorily with historical times; it was concerned with dates and dynasties, with battles and biographies. It walked with kings and warriors and missed the common touch.

Such a book as this before us is a good example of the sounder modern method. It is liberally and wisely illustrated; it goes down to the roots of things; it puts before boys and girls, as it claims to do, a history of the people from the earliest times. The development of civilization based upon the progressive use of implements and weapons is well shown, from the early to the late use of flint, the discovery of bronze, its supersession by iron. It indicates the close connection between geology, geography and history. The choice of poetic quotations is wise.

The Message of the Lessons. By J. Anthony Wood, M.A. W. Heffer and Sons. 4s. 6d. A series of short introductions to the Lessons for Sundays and Holy Days in the Revised Lectionary. The Convocation of Canterbury, in presenting its proposals for the New Lectionary in 1927, recommended that the reader of the Lessons should introduce them with a brief word of explanation. This book is offered for that purpose. It is reprinted from the *Guardian*, in which it appeared serially. The contribution of the Lessons to the message of each Sunday and Holy Day is not always apparent to the uninstructed and the inattentive. These brief introductions, by a priest of long teaching experience, should help to correct both ignorance and inattention. H. L. C.

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